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Abstract
Babin, Jeﬀrey, Jobu Morris. Ph.D. The University of Memphis, May, 2017. Choice
in Consideration of the Other: an Experimental Approach. Major Professor: Andrew
Hussey, Ph.D.
This dissertation explores behaviors that are exhibited in dyadic economic games, in which
the individual players often reveal social preferences, involving utility derived from acting
on behalf of another. I explore related concepts of trust, altruism, communication (in the
form of linguistic signaling), and social norms – topics not well handled by conventional
theory. In each essay, I design and execute laboratory experiments to test whether agent
decisions deviate from theoretical predictions and to determine to what degree individual
characteristics can imply social preferences, influence belief formation, or imply judgments
based upon stereotypes.
The topics of conditional judgment and linguistic signaling are at the forefront of experimental economic research. In the first essay, I explore the eﬀects of types of computermediated communication, including emojis, on trust behavior. Modalities of CMC have
varying degrees of signaling content, influencing an agent’s beliefs about (and judgments
of) an anonymous counterpart.
In the second essay, I conduct a methodological horserace between content analysis
(a traditional research approach) and a more objective, incentivized coordination game
framework. I find that by three criteria, the later is a more eﬃcient method for mining
group opinions and belief structures within an experimental context.
In the third essay, I explore choices over shared lotteries, in which the welfare of
a passive member of a dyad is dictated by a shielding agent in the face of asymmetric
consequences. I find that females are overwhelmingly more likely to shield a dyad. There is
a strong social norm for shielding a pair, in particular when outcomes are disproportionate.
Such behavior mirrors real-life situations, such as the decision to uptake a vaccination.

iv

Contents

1 Introduction

1

2 A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words: Emojis, Computer-Mediated
Communication, and Trust

3

2.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

3

2.2

Experimental Design and Hypotheses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

2.3

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

2.4

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

3 Gender Perception of Emoji Signals: Content Analysis vs. Incentivized Coordination Games

59

3.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59

3.2

Incentivized Classification Game Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

3.3

Experimental Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

3.4

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65

3.5

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

4 Shielding Behavior, Social Norms, and Reciprocity in One Shot Games 74
4.1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 74

4.2

Experimental Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77

4.3

Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 91

4.4

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97

Bibliography

100

5
Appendix
Appendix

106

v

List of Tables
Table

Page

1

Characteristic Breakdown of Sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

2

Treatment Eﬀect on Trust Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

3

Treatment Eﬀects for CMC on Trust, Trustworthiness, and Payoﬀs . . . 32

4

CMC Eﬀects by Type on Trust, Trustworthiness, Payoﬀs . . . . . . . . . 34

5

Conditional Likelihood of Initiating CMC, T2 and T3 . . . . . . . . . . 36

6

Marginal Eﬀects on Trust Variables, T2, by Word Type . . . . . . . . . 40

7

Subject Characteristics, Signals received by Role in T3 . . . . . . . . . . 46

8

Marginal Eﬀects on Trust Decisions, T3, by Emoji Type . . . . . . . . . 49

9

Likelihood Subject is Dark Skinned Female by Amount Sent . . . . . . . 50

10

Linguistic Analysis of Answers to #34, by Role . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53

11

Incentivized Coordination Game for Classification . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62

12

Characteristic Breakdown of Sample, by Gender and Treatment . . . . . 65

13

Emoji Task Classifications (sample)

14

Paired t- test, Classification Distribution, by Treatment . . . . . . . . . 68

15

Determinants of Task Duration Time

16

Characteristics of Frequent Emoji Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72

17

Probability of Shielding, Treatment Eﬀects, Full Sample . . . . . . . . . 92

18

Gender Frequency by Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

19

Probability of Shielding Conditional on Health Domain

20

Summary statistics, Chapter 2 (Full Sample) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107

21

Summary statistics, Chapter 2, T3 (Restricted Sample)

22

Pearson’s r Tests, Emoji Signals Sent and Group of Sender . . . . . . . . 108

23

Debriefing Survey, Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109

24

Debriefing Survey, Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
vi

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

. . . . . . . . . 96

. . . . . . . . . 108

25

Summary Statistics for Subjects, Chapter 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110

26

Summary Statistics of Emoji Classifications, Chapter 3

27

Summary statistics, Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111

28

Instrument, Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112

29

Debriefing Survey, Chapter 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113

vii

. . . . . . . . . 110

List of Figures
Figure

Page

1

Emoji, Aﬀect, and Identity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

2

Subjects by Group (n=301) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

3

Box Plots for Psychometric Variables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

4

Mean Trust Variables, by Treatment and Subject Characteristic . . . . . . 24

5

Mean Trust Variables, by Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

6

Dyad Action Plots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

7

Instances of Emoji Signals Received . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47

8

Frequency of an Emoji Evaluated by Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67

9

Diﬀerence in Variance between Treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68

10

Task Duration Time, by Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69

11

Task Duration Time, by Treatment and Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70

12

Lab Design Flow . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78

13

Shielding Game, symmetric “bad” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82

14

Shielding Game, asymmetric “bad” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84

15

Shielding Game, symmetric “bad” w/treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

16

Shielding Game, asymmetric “bad” w/treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86

17

Amount Returned by Treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93

18

Percentage of shielding agents, by gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94

19

Amounts Returned, by Gender . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95

20

Chapter 3 Instruments, IC and CA treatments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106

21

Chapter 4 Instruments, Shared Lotteries, Symmetric and Asymmetric . . . 106

viii

7

Introduction
Pro-social acts exist in the real-world and are essential ingredients of any persistent
economic system. Behavioral concepts such as trust, altruism, social norms, and communication are intuitive economic primitives – most economic exchanges would never
take place without them. Discussions of these pillars of exchange date back to Adam
Smith’s A Theory of Moral Sentiments. However, theoretical predictions of standard
models typically exclude insights emanating from these commonly observed behaviors.
An experimental setting is optimal for many economic studies, in part because it clearly
identifies individual behavior lost in aggregate, secondary data. This work is an example
of this approach.
In the first essay (Chapter 2), I focus on communication and ask: What types of
computer-mediated communication (CMC) are more important in the decision to trust
and reciprocate? It is known that communication is a crucial component of economic
trust. This link is intriguing in a digitally-oriented world with CMC as the new norm. This
paper reports the results of an experiment using emoji and text messaging in laboratory
Investment games. Using chat mining, linguistic analysis, and an emoji-classification
coordination game to decompose logs, I find that trust increases dramatically with the
introduction of emojis to one-shot games, while reciprocation of trust increases modestly.
Emoji use leads to welfare gains, although these are shared disproportionately. Aﬀective
content, skin tone, and gender signals embedded in emojis impact sharing, indicative of
statistical discrimination. Receiving a dark skinned emoji has negative eﬀect on trust for
both light and dark skinned players – a result in conflict with current in-group literature.
An emoji suggestive of a female counterpart garners more trust. In this way, computermediated communication leads to reduced gains for dark-skinned persons and increased
surplus for women. Yet, this discrimination is not warranted – all demographic groups act
in a trustworthy manner, exhibiting strong preferences for equitable splits. These results
highlight the complex social judgment that motivates trust in an anonymous counterpart.
Content analysis (sometimes called ‘opinion mining’) is a research technique used to
1

make replicable and valid inferences by interpreting and coding contextual media. In
this way, qualitative data can be converted into something quantitatively useful. Yet,
this method is problematic since content is subjectively assessed by individual reviewers
being compensated with a flat rate scheme. In Chapter 3, I use two experimental labor
markets as a horse-race framework to determine the eﬃciency of traditional content analysis relative to an objective, “social norms” approach for identifying gender stereotypes.
I employ subjects in an incentivized coordination game for the classification of emoji
messages by gender association. In this gender classification task of messages, the variance in responses in the game treatment is consistently decreased, relative to the content
analysis baseline. Results vary by gender, indicating a diﬀerent perception of message
origin. I conclude that incentivized coordination games are a methodologically superior
way to classify informational content of otherwise subjective responses and to identify
stereotypes.
In the real world, probabilistic outcomes for two individuals are often inexorably linked.
Acting on behalf of others in a shared lottery context lies at the frontier of current economic literature, while how agents choose actions on behalf of a dyad has yet to be explored. In the third essay (Chapter 4), I model the core of this behavior, shielding, in an
experimental setting. In a 2x2 Shielding game design with randomized treatments, a coordination game for elicitation of social norms, and logistic regressions over domain-specific
attitudes, I explore the eﬀects of prospective reciprocity and asymmetric consequences.
These findings are both deviations from game theoretical and Expected Utility Theory
predictions. There appears to be a strong social norm for shielding in all treatments, most
evident in the case of asymmetric consequences. Females are far more likely to sacrifice to
shield a vulnerable counterpart. Preventive health behaviors, such as the HPV vaccine,
incorporate shielding and have important social benefits.
These observations may lead to a scheme of behavioral nudges, in which tastes for
pro-social behavior enhance welfare more eﬀectively than monetary incentives.

2

A Picture is Worth a Thousand Words: Emojis, Computer-Mediated
Communication, and Trust
Introduction
Communication is a pivotal element in the enhancement of trust, a process that generates
economic surplus. This paper explores the eﬀect of emojis, an emerging type of computermediated communication (CMC), on interpersonal trusting behavior. Conventional economic theory primarily concerns itself with interactions among anonymous agents. In
reality, human beings pay attention to information they have regarding other agents,
including emotional content and any identifying characteristics (e.g., gender, ethnicity)
found via communication. Emojis act as digital shorthand: expressions of emotions, ideas,
and personae that enable users to sidestep the costs involved with saying something precisely with text.1 They are a common mechanism by which people chat, filter messages
and emails before opening them, and interpret consumer product reviews. Given that an
average adult reads at a speed of 300 words of text per minute, a picture may be “worth
a thousand words” in terms of cognitive load.
In this paper, I ask what eﬀect emoji-driven communication has on interpersonal trust
and associated economic gains, and how agents use and interpret these signals. I perform
a laboratory experiment in which I exogenously restrict the type of communication players can use in the seminal “Investment game” (Berg, Dickhaut, & McCabe, 1995). This
game allows for the exchange of money in a manner that creates potential surplus (a
growing pie), and captures intuitive measures of trust (money sent), reciprocity (a percentage returned), and social welfare (final payoﬀs). This design allows me to isolate and
compare the potential welfare enhancing eﬀects of emoji, relative to text messaging and
no communication at all. Another innovation is including psychometric variables to help
extricate the eﬀects of CMC from an overall propensity people may have for pro-social
1

When one decides to use an emoji, as in any form of communication, they make a decision about how to
position them self in relation to a counterpart. From a linguistic standpoint, any eﬀective communication
must include elements of aﬀect, tone, and/or identity. A thorough treatment of how CMC relates to
projection of identity can be found in Crystal (2004) and Graham (2015).
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behavior. Exploiting a demographically diverse subject pool of active mobile device users,
I determine the characteristics of a “trusting” agent – how trust varies by background and
attitude – and whether the perception of a counterpart’s skin tone or gender matters. Using emoji found in game chat logs, I employ linguistic analysis and a novel classification
method to categorize types of emoji “signals,” then determine their eﬀects on trust and
welfare. I then search for evidence that these eﬀects are driven by conditional judgments
of trustworthiness – essentially, attempts to statistically discriminate.2
I find that trust increases dramatically with the introduction of emoji to one-shot
interactions. While text alone also enhances trust, the stronger eﬀect comes from emoji
use. Reciprocation (return of money by a trustee) is weakly aﬀected, meaning awarding
trust barely pays. While this does lead to some being better oﬀ, the recipients of trust
receive most of the surplus. However, distribution of these gains is not even – females
receive more gains from increased trust, while dark skinned persons benefit far less. I also
find evidence that the embedded aﬀective and identifying content in emojis can encourage
or inhibit trust, impacting welfare gains. Decision-makers receiving an emoji portraying
a dark skin tone appear far less willing to send currency to their counterpart, suggesting
that agents base actions on some degree of statistical discrimination, to the detriment of
some and the benefit of others. This result is common to agents of either skin tone type,
conflicting with previous notions of in-group/out-group cooperation. Intriguingly, all demographic groups act in a trustworthy manner that does not warrant this discrimination,
exhibiting strong preferences for equitable splits. I conclude that conditional judgment
(and stereotypes) is at the core of the trust relationship, and emojis are distinctive signals
that help to drive, or dissuade, cooperative behavior.
The technological state of the world has resulted in dramatic changes in modes people use to communicate, making these research questions timely. Trust is an economic
2

Eckel and Wilson (2004a) suggest that people do not view trust as a problem involving traditional
notions of risk aversion (e.g., a financial gamble), but rather as one in which one’s choice of action is
contingent on social judgment. Trust is “socially risky” – society as a whole may be made better or
worse oﬀ by agents’ behavior.
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primitive – most exchanges remain unrealized without it. Ideally, such exchanges equate
to enhanced social welfare. Trust behavior derives from expectations and beliefs about
others, and may stem from stereotypes (correct, incorrect, or self-fulfilling) triggered by
content in communication. Day to day reality involves digital channels – email, texting,
instant-messaging, Skype and Facebook – to the relative discount of face-to-face communication. Emojis are increasingly representative in mobile discourse and social media.3
Written “text” form divorces electronic language from gestures, facial expressions, and
characteristic features. Emojis are compact, digital linguistic devices making information exchanges more eﬃcient while adding richness to communication. Mobile devices
now allow users to customize emojis by skin tone and gender, a commonly used feature
pioneered by Apple in 2015 (Figure 1a). A fundamental argument in this paper is that
emojis can be noisy, but salient, signals from which agents form a conditional judgment.
Following this rapid expansion of emoji use, “emoji-marketing” has exploded, as firms
enthusiastically attempt to beam their message in the few seconds of consumer attention
they have. With this functionality, emojis are now accepted as a nuanced form of panlinguistic expression – often crossing demographic and cultural barriers. Top business
schools teach classes on maximizing revenues via digital media marketing. A bevy of
entities, ranging from political figures to corporate branding experts have embraced them.
Social media juggernaut Facebook recently augmented their iconic thumbs-up “like” icon
to allow for various emoticons (a subset of emojis). Amazon.com is exploring replacing
their star-based consumer feedback system with emojis. Digital communication is the
new norm, with emojis leading this sea change.
Economic interactions depend heavily on the perception of others. There is reason
to believe that when agents are uncertain about the trustworthiness of their counterpart, they make inferences about reliability from any information about the counterpart
3

Emojitracker (http://emojitracker.com/), a leading website monitoring the use of emojis on Twitter in
realtime, has detected almost 10 billion of them just over the past two years. The Oxford Dictionaries
“Word of the Year” for 2015 is an emoji, oﬃcially called the ‘Face with Tears of Joy’ (Figure 1b),
chosen as the “word” that best reflected the ethos, mood, and preoccupations of 2015. The evolution of
standardized emojis has outpaced the Unicode Consortium’s ability to keep up.
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available to them, instinctively try to “read” others in order to make a determination of
trustworthiness.4 While welfare improving decisions often prevail, the result of this judgmental calculus is that people often resort to favoritism, stereotyping, and discrimination.
Thus, understanding the emoji-trust relationship has direct applications to interpersonal
exchange, electronic marketing, labor market screening, and the dating market. Individuals will receive better outcomes when mindful of how emojis can impact the conditional
judgment of others. The wrong signal may lead to unintended consequences. Firms will
want to choose emoji that best align with the beliefs of their target consumers, while
governmental agencies should consider restricting types of CMC that might be associated
with implicit discrimination.
Behavioral research into communication and trusting behavior recently has seen considerable growth with the degree of heterogeneity across subjects a key facet. Cox (2004)
finds that behavior in trust games can vary systematically in agents’ propensities to trust
and to reciprocate, but another source of heterogeneity is individuals’ expectation of treatment by others. This means certain beliefs about one’s counterpart can influence actions,
and how one chooses to communicate might influence these beliefs. Economic studies
have yet to focus on key features of digital messaging – now a dominant part of our
lives. Hence, much remains unknown about how types of emerging digital communication
modes impact trust, and their impact on potential welfare improvements. Is the role of an
emoji simply one of cost-cutting convenience, or compellingly, that of a noisy – but salient
– signal? If so, what types of emojis most impact trust interactions and who stands to
benefit? The purpose of this study is to clarify this role.
I link this inquiry to two areas of the economic literature on trust: the relationship
between communication and trust interactions and the eﬀect of emotional content or identifying characteristics on trusting decisions. While economic intent, such as “bargaining”
or “striking a deal”, also have role in an agent’s choice of communication, the expression
4

Seminal studies in social psychology indicate that the human face speaks more clearly than words –
people pay enormous attention to faces. To determine the credibility of an individual’s emotional state
or intent, the face is critical (Ekman, 1977).

6

(b) ‘Face with Tears of Joy’ emoji, the Oxford Dic(a) Apple emojis and identifying characteristics tionaries “Word of the Year” for 2015

Figure 1: Emoji, Aﬀect, and Identity
of aﬀect and identity likely influence actions in trust decisions. An agent’s behavior in a
social dilemma is likely motivated by their role in that interaction and how they perceive
their position relative to another.
Numerous experiments focus on the role of natural language communication in economic exchange, but none center on emojis. Roth (1995) provides the classic economic
explanation, proposing that both the mode of communication and social utility are important factors for the eﬀectiveness communication.5 The traditional view held that
face-to-face (FTF) communication is more eﬀective in achieving cooperative outcomes
than any kind of indirect communication, yet recent studies show that CMC has a significant eﬀect on pro-social behavior in the lab. Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) find
strong eﬀects from written, free-form messages in dyadic trust games when they are interpreted as “promises”, with cooperation resulting from the guilt associated with ignoring
a struck accord.6 One outcome may be that text and emoji have no discernible eﬀects,
with the terms of an implicit or explicit promise being what matters. Ben-Ner, Putterman, and Ren (2007) allow agents to use CMC text across varying treatments, finding
that communication enhanced both trust and reciprocity, with the more complex form
of communication yielding the highest returns. In recent experiments, CMC is found to
increase trust and surplus when agents communicate with complex, digital media, such
5

Studies almost universally demonstrate that introducing communication to cooperative and trust games
in the lab increases socially beneficial actions, beginning with discussions in Isaac and Walker (1988)
and Davis and Holt (1993).

6

An analysis of the messages sent in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) is provided in Houser and Xiao
(2011). A review of these data reveals that in several instances, players sent emoticon “smiley faces.”
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as video game avatars (Fiedler & Haruvy, 2009), Facebook (Abatayo, Lynham, & Sherstyuk, 2015), and text chat (Chen & Chen, 2011), indicating that digital modes may
induce social utility comparable to FTF. The consensus is that communication matters
for enhancing trust and trustworthiness, a finding widespread in many bargaining studies.
Studies also find informational value in knowing the emotional state of a counterpart.
Several experimental studies demonstrate that the perception of a counterpart’s characteristics or emotional state has value and impacts trust. In experimental trust games,
subjects tend to perceive smiles as “honest” signals that enhance returns to sharing.7
Much of this literature builds on the structure of Eckel and Wilson (2004a), in which the
authors find aﬀective icons representing a potential counterpart can aﬀect the choice to
trust. Given that emojis can express emotion, behavior in an economic game including
them may resemble that observed in Xiao and Houser (2005), where recipients of money
choose costly punishment with lower probability (and are more likely to accept unfair
outcomes) when the possibility to convey feelings about dubious oﬀers exists in a quick
and inexpensive manner. Emojis, as emulations of faces or body language, may provide
pivotal information to a situation in which trust and reciprocity increase earnings and
augment overall eﬃciency.
As people attribute behavior to a “type”, rather than to a situation, they may lower
cognitive or psychological costs by stereotyping (Ross & Nisbett, 2011). Given well documented in-group/out-group tendencies, this leads to the hypothesis that people trust
“outsiders” with low probability. People often make a decision about others based on
some type of signal that can be quickly read and interpreted.8 In many cases, one’s
choice of an emoji is a signal of identity, such as using a gender-oriented wave, or a
dark skinned “thumbs up.” Reception of such might influence trusting behavior and an
7

Typically, a signal associates with an explicit cost, but even if a signal comes at no monetary cost, costs
may be implicit (opportunity cost of time) or psychological (cognitively strenuous). See Centorrino,
Djemai, Hopfensitz, Milinski, and Seabright (2015) and Scharlemann, Eckel, Kacelnik, and Wilson
(2001).

8

Specific identifying characteristics that have been shown to influence trust and reciprocity include:
gender (Buchan, Croson, & Solnick, 2008); beauty and age (Garbarino & Slonim, 2009; Wilson & Eckel,
2006); and skin shade (Fershtman & Gneezy, 2001; Naef & Schupp, 2009; Wilson & Eckel, 2006).
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economic exchange. If people tend to prefer certain types as counterparts in trust interactions, sending an emoji indicating a particular gender or skin shade or could be beneficial
(or detrimental) to one’s hopes for a positive return. Such a signal is far less likely to
occur in a texting environment. Positioning one’s self as a member of a particular group,
via emoji use, may increase an agent’s trust or reciprocation. Eckel and Petrie (2011) find
that subjects in trust games are occasionally willing to pay for such identifying information (in this case, a demand side eﬀect for photos), yet may choose to remain ignorant
(even at a price of zero). In a forthcoming paper, List and Heyes (2016) find similar eﬀects
on the supply side, where subjects are willing to pay to supply identifying information.
The motivation behind this action may be “playing the victim” or “acting the damsel in
distress,” and assumes a positive return to this positioning. In each of these scenarios,
the choice of an emoji may serve as a linguistic snapshot of a subject, impacting potential
trust and reciprocity. This warrants exploration, as CMC is rapidly becoming commonplace, to the discount of face to face, written, or voice communication. To date, the role
of CMC – emojis in particular – is not well defined by economic literature. Many past experimental studies explore non-binding communication (often referred to as “cheap talk”
or “bargaining content”), in which agreements are not enforceable. I extent this inquiry
by exploring the role of signaling content in chat data. This is the first paper to look at
dyadic trust using emoji, and the first empirical support for the economic value of emojis
as a mode of communication. I also contribute to this body of work by examining all
facets of trust behavior (changes due to attitudes, behavior, and discourse) in a single
experimental setting. I also add insight to the relationship between digital media, stereotypes, and trust. This paper adds clarity to the mixed evidence regarding the cooperative
behavior of men and women or that found in other domains, as well as to literatures
on other-regarding preferences (fairness) and signaling content (value of information) in
economic experiments. Such findings remain masked in observational studies that exclude
behavior in a controlled setting.
To my knowledge, no other economic study analyzes emoji use by “type” in the lab.
9

By implementing a coordination game-based, “gender perception” categorization task in
my treatment analysis, I present the first application of emoji classification by normative
standard for non-text electronic media. Following the approach introduced in Houser and
Xiao (2011), I extend the objective content evaluation into digital language realm. While
computerized experiments are the new paradigm, this design diﬀers from previous studies
by employing a mobile device based app to collect data, adding a “taste of the field,” by
allowing subjects to interact much as they might in the real world, while still maintaining
the desired level of control found in traditional methods. The dataset features responses
from a pool of college students at one of the most demographically diverse large public
universities in the United States. This is a unique advantage in three ways. First, this
helps temper validity concerns that plague other studies. Appropriate to this study’s
inquiry, diversity in these subjects allows for a greater opportunity to observe signaling
content present in CMC and the possible eﬀect of beliefs and stereotypes. Finally, analysis
of these data suggests an emerging societal change due to the advent of digital content
found in mobile communication modes. The behavior of the college students in this study
should serve as a harbinger of a new paradigm in bargaining communication, present in
a multitude of markets.
The structure of this manuscript continues as follows. In Section 2, discusses how my
contributions position relative to the current state of knowledge in economics. Section
3 details the experimental design, methodology, and summarizes the data. Section 4
includes a description of results, including treatment eﬀects and linguistic analysis. This
consists of analysis of behavior, beliefs, and attitudes of subjects in the Investment Game
treatments, and a determination of what signals – if any – aﬀect the behavioral variables
of interest. Section 5 provides a perspective for experimental results, discusses areas for
continued research, and concludes. All figures, tables, and experimental documentation
are found in the Appendices.
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Experimental Design and Hypotheses
The laboratory provides a powerful tool for understanding both linguistic roles and strategic behavior, both being diﬃcult to measure in other methodologies. This paper’s main
arguments are that emojis impact trust and that judgement conditional on communication content included in emojis is a core element of the trust relationship. Thus, the
introduction of each type of CMC should elicit diﬀerent trust outcomes.
In the economics lab, agents exhibit trust as a pro-social behavior (sending positive
amounts of currency), where reciprocated trust has the potential to improve the monetary wellbeing of both participants, i.e. there are potential Pareto improvements. Thus,
dyadic trust is an exchange transaction, in which a decision about whether and how much
to reciprocate is likely to be determined by conditional judgement of intent and norms
concerning fairness or obligation.
My first set of hypotheses stems from this primary question. The literature firmly
supports the notion that allowing communication of any variety increases trust, and in
some cases, trustworthiness. Regarding trust, I expected the average amount sent by
a player to be greater when communication is present, consistent with results such as
in Charness and Dufwenberg (2006), Ben-Ner et al. (2007), and others. While previous
studies provide no consensus, I predict that the additional informational value of CMC
may improve trustworthiness overall, perhaps as informational signals give agents an
indication of “deservedness.” Finally, as a result of the change in these trusting behaviors, I
expect there to be accompanying welfare gains, in the form of increased payoﬀs. Following
the findings in other studies, these measures will likely vary by treatment, role, and subject
characteristic (such as gender and attitude measure).
Should these treatment eﬀects be present, the next set of hypotheses involve what is
behind the diﬀerences. I expect that informational content in emojis should matter in the
trust decision. Players may use the aﬀective state of their counterpart as a basis for trust,
or employ conditional judgment given identifiable characteristics (some degree of statis-
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tical discrimination) to guide their actions in the game. If these factors influence trust
diﬀerently, then there will be beneficiaries from increased surplus, while some judgments
may penalize others.
Subjects
I recruited 301 volunteers from undergraduate classes at the Fogelman College of Business
and Economics and the College of Arts and Sciences at the University of Memphis. Ad hoc
power tests ( > .5, power = 0.8, ↵ = 0.05) indicated a target sample size of 240 subjects
distributed into 3 treatments; the final total of 301 students recruited was to ensure I
collected a suﬃcient sample of chat data. The study took place over 7 sessions. A session
leader conducted each session, read the instructions aloud, and was accompanied by a
minimum of 2 session assistants. The number of subjects across sessions varied, ranging
from 30 to 87.
Table 1 gives a concise breakdown of the participating subjects. Forty-one percent
were female (uniform across treatment groups). The average student reported having
a 3.49 grade point average. The survey did not ask for commonly used ethnic/cultural
background. Instead I asked subjects to rate their skin tone on a 4-point darkness scale,
corresponding to the Fitzpatrick Scale (1975), a the standard used by the Unicode Consortium to classify skin tone modifiers in emojis. Forty-four percent reported having a
“brown” or “dark” skin tone. 90.2% of subjects considered English their native or first
language.
An important dimension of this study is the mobile device expertise of the subjects.
The vast majority (87%) of the subjects were aged 19-22. 98% said they used text chat or
electronic messaging everyday, while 75% reported using emoji in some form every day,
79% in the emoji treatment. I did not deem cross platform matches a significant loss of
control or excess measurement error.9 About one-fifth (21.3%) said they had experience
9

It is possible that images sent may not look exactly the same once received across diﬀerent mobile
platforms, but in the end this not was a common occurrence. Over the entire sample, 81% of the
subjects used a mobile device with an Apple OS operating system (85% in the emoji treatment). Of
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participating in an interaction similar to the Investment game in their lives, and 9% said
they had exposure to game theory.
Design Structure
The primary inquiry in this paper is whether access to emoji chat has any significant correlation with levels of trust, trustworthiness, and welfare. It is also key to compare this
with that of text chat. In order to isolate the eﬀect of each, I created a controlled interaction environment. Students (n = 301) participated in a 1x3 within subject experimental
design in which:
• a baseline (T1) group plays a one shot Investment Game with no communication
allowed (as a control)
• a treatment group (T2) plays a one shot Investment Game with the ability to communicate via in-game text chat (without emoji)
• a treatment group (T3) plays a one shot Investment Game, in which the ability to
communicate is restricted to emoji (without text)
This set up allows for measurement of treatment eﬀects by analysis of communication
logs (text versus emoji) by their social context, aﬀective content, and identifying features
as well as game-relevant context (discussion of games and strategies). By doing this, I can
identify how social components of CMC diﬀer significantly across communication media.
Assuming significant treatment eﬀects, my next task is to consider which communicative
elements in emojis are most eﬀective in enhancing trust and trustworthiness. I achieve
this by analyzing chat log data compiled during the game sessions.
I conducted all treatments using the MobLab mobile device interface, a cloud-based
system (MobLab, 2016). All subjects used their own mobile devices after downloading the
the 151 dyads in the full study, only 15% consisted of cross platform interaction, and only 2 dyads in
the emoji treatment had diﬀerent operating system. Only 5 subjects raised concerns about technical
limitations during a session, and all of these occurred with older Samsung smartphones. These subjects
were paid a $5 participation fee and dismissed.
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instrument app, guided by session assistants.10 The duration of the interaction in all sessions was 5 minutes. Once time expired, or upon final action by the Responder, the game
was over. At the end of each treatment, subjects filled out the debriefing questionnaire.
Subjects were unaware of the diﬀerent treatment conditions of the experiment.
When subjects arrived at the classroom lab, they signed a consent form, and then
logged into the instrument application. Each seated subject was spaced apart and instructed not to talk to others. They were given permission to electronically message or
browse the Internet, rather than converse with one another once in the lab, until we were
ready to start. I intend this as a priming device and to ensure there would be minimal
loss of control.11 Once the session began, the session leader instructed everyone to stop
browsing and to open the experimental app. Oral instructions were read aloud and projected onto an overhead screen prior to the activity, including visual representations of
the instrument. Subjects were asked to raise their hands if they had a question, and a
session assistant would come to them. In a post-experiment questionnaire, 98.1% indicated that the instructions were clear. At the beginning of the session, and just prior the
game, the session leader advised subjects that failure to follow instructions might result
in their losing additional earnings (but not the show up fee, which they received for the
completion of a questionnaire). Throughout the course of the experiment, there was no
deception.
In the first part of the experiment, subjects were randomly paired with another individual to play a one-shot Investment game (described below), with each treatment allowing a
diﬀerent mode of communication, as detailed above. The roles in the game were randomly
assigned. The interface informed subjects of their in-play earnings. In the second part,
they completed the debriefing survey. At the end each session, subjects were excused,
directed to a pre-determined, separate room from the session, and allowed to individually
10

11

While this instrument is a departure from electronic lab standards, such as zTree (Fischbacher, 2007),
there are definite advantages, such as a “taste of the field” and a larger potential session size. The
University of Memphis does not have an experimental facility suitable to this study. I don’t consider
this a substantial loss of control, as there was monitoring and a warning about following instructions.
Full instructions and procedures found in the Appendix of this paper.
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redeem the virtual earnings totals for cash at a ratio of 10: US $1, plus a $5 participation
fee. I invited a member of Campus Police Services to monitor post-session transactions,
for safety reasons. Once paid, subjects signed a payment receipt on the consent forms.
The average amount paid for in-game earnings was $8.67 per subject, and the study paid
out a total of $4425, including participation fees.12
The Investment Game (baseline)
The Investment Game (Berg et al., 1995) remains the standard for measuring interpersonal
trust and trustworthiness in experimental literature, in part due to its simplicity and the
intuitive use of a split currency endowment. Overwhelmingly in such studies, decision
behavior frequently deviates from game theoretical predictions because players care about
the outcomes of other players, or recognize the potential gains from added surplus.
I define the game as a triple

= {I, SI , UI }, and is played as follows. Players are

randomly assigned into pair, which remains fixed, and to one of two roles: the Investor
or the Responder ; so the set of players I = {i, r}, indexed i = 1, 2, ..., I; r = 1, 2, ..., R.
Each game consists of 2 stages. In stage one, the player assigned to be the Investor i
is given an endowment of money e = $100 in virtual currency, and decides on an integer
amount Mi 2 [0, 100] to send to the Responder. Here forward, I stay close to the original
notation in Berg et al. (1995).
A strategy si 2 SI for i is an amount to send to the Responder in the first stage:
Mi 2 [0, 100]. This amount is tripled for a total return of 3Mi . The result of any positive
amount sent is a social surplus of 2Mi .
In the second stage the Responder having, received 3Mi , decides how much to return
to the first-mover, kr (3Mi ). Thus, strategy sr 2 Sr for r is an amount to return, denoted
by: kr (3Mi ), where k is a mapping kr : {0, 3, 6, ..., 300} ! {0, 1, 2, ..., 300}. The set of
all strategies is then SI = Si ⇥ Sr = {Mi 2 [0, 100] ⇥ kr (3Mi )}, representing all possible
12

While the debrief did not ask players to predict the actions of their counterparts, it did ask them
whether their counterpart acted as they had expected. 59.88% of Investors reported their counterparts
acted as they had expected, compared to 51.52% of Responders.
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combinations of amounts sent and returned. Player i chooses Mi to solve a payoﬀ function

max Ui (Mi , kr ) = $100
Mi

Mi + kr (3Mi ).

(0.0.1)

kr (3Mi ).

(0.0.2)

Player r solves payoﬀ function

max Ur (Mi , kr ) = 3Mi
kr

A rational player prefers to maximize her utility, while choosing an allocation that is
a best response to everything her counterpart might choose to do. A Nash equilibrium
is a strategy profile in which each player is acting in a manner that is a best response.
With this concept, the theory predicts many potential equilibrium outcomes. To eliminate a multitude of non-realistic equilibria (from non-credible threats) action, I impose
a refinement, subgame perfection. Because this game is composed of finite elements, I
can use backwards induction to prune equilibria and determine the subgame perfect Nash
equilibrium.
Backward induction consists of starting at the end of the game (with the Responder)
and identifying the utility maximizing action, an amount sent. If this player maximizes
her utility and is rational, all other actions are strictly dominated by sending no money
back – keeping all that was sent to her and saying “I’m best oﬀ not being trustworthy.”
Moving forward to the Investor, who moves first, knowing that the Responder would
act rationally, must decide what endowment to send. If the forward looking Investor is
rational, she will send nothing, which strictly dominates sending any positive amount,
anticipating a return of zero – keeping the entire endowment and saying “I’m best oﬀ not
trusting.” This leaves a single equilibrium condition in which the SPNE is for neither
player to exhibit trusting behavior.
Subjects have monotone and risk neutral preferences in Mi , so the best response
strategy
s⇤r = arg max Ur = kr (3Mi ) = 0
16

(0.0.3)

strictly dominates any other amount for Player r for all i.13
Anticipating their counterpart’s dominant strategy, the best response strategy for
Player i is
s⇤i = arg max Ui = Mi = 0,

(0.0.4)

strictly dominant over any other amount M̂i to send, for all r. Thus, the unique SPNE
is a strategy profile s⇤ = (Mi , kr (3Mi )) = {(0, 0)}, in which no amount of money is ever
exchanged, resulting in a payoﬀ of the initial endowment for the Investor and nothing for
the Responder, (100,0).
In contrast to the SPNE in which no Investor sends a positive amount and no Responder can reciprocate, previous results from variations on this game indicate that trust is
widespread and often reciprocated.14 Using prior experimental research as an indicator,
I expect deviations from the SPNE. With these predictions as a baseline, I refer to any
positive amount sent Mi > 0 as a Player i “placing trust” in her counterpart. Likewise,
Player r, in reciprocation, is “trustworthy” for any positive amount returned that is at
least as much as what she received, kr (3Mi )

Mi . I define a response function ✓r as the

percentage returned, given the amount sent by the Investor. This is my primary measure
of the “degree” to which one exhibits trustworthiness

✓r =

kr (3Mi )
8Mi > 0 ) ✓r 2 [0, 3].
Mi

(0.0.5)

Because ✓r unknown to Player i, any action placing “trust” with a positive amount
sent Mi is socially risky, in that there exists positive probability that the Responder
will not reciprocate, and that the potential surplus will not be realized (including loss
of the amount sent). Nevertheless, given that Mi triples, there exists a potential Pareto
13

This is a simplifying assumption, consistent with the observation that risk aversion is not a driver of
responses in many experimental studies (see Eckel & Wilson, 2004a and Eckel & Wilson, 2004b ). This
also underscores the fact the trust involves social, rather that financial, risk.
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A meta-analysis of 84 published experiments (Johnson & Mislin, 2011) shows that, on average, trusters
send 50.8% of their endowment. Trust barely pays oﬀ, in that 36.5% of what is sent is returned, just
over the 33.3% that compensates Player i for what was sent, however, this measure is highly sensitive
to environmental and social factors.
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improving outcome, in which the monetary pie gets larger (by 2Mi ) and both players
might be made better oﬀ as compared to the SPNE. This only happens if Player r gives
up some money.
Let each treatment in the experimental set up be indexed by j = 1, 2, 3. My hypothesis
is that the average level of trust M̄i,j increases in T2 and T3 relative to the baseline T1.
This implies

M̄i,j > 0 for some i, j, i = 1, 2, ..., I; j = 1, 2, 3, so,

I

1X
Mi,3 ,
I i=1

I

(0.0.6)

I

1X
1X
Mi,2 , >
Mi,1 , M̄3
I i=1
I i=1

M̄2 > M̄1

(0.0.7)

Likewise, I expect trustworthiness to increase in T2 and T3 relative to T1, where the
average percentage returned ✓¯j by Responders in Treatments 2 and 3 increases relative to
the baseline. Responders are indexed by r = 1, 2, ..., R to disambiguate from Investors,
but since there are fixed role dyads, I = R. This hypothesis means:

R

1 X kr (3Mi,3 )
R r=1 Mi,3

R

R

1 X kr (3Mi,2 )
1 X kr (3Mi,1 )
>
, 8Mi 6= 0
R r=1 Mi,2
R r=1 Mi,1
, ✓¯3 ✓¯2 > ✓¯1 .

The hypothesis of welfare gains from trust means that there will exist some set of
strategies that is not the SPNE, in which some money is passed by the first-mover, and
that payoﬀs reflect gains from the larger pie (i.e., they are not the initial conditions of
$100 for the Investor and $0 for the Responder).
Debriefing Questionnaire
Subjects in all treatments completed a debriefing survey immediately after playing the
Investment game, conducted on the same mobile interface the subjects used for the game.
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The survey is an instrument to collect psychometrics on risk and altruism/pro-social, and
trust attitudes, to garner demographic and mobile device use information, and to ensure
subjects understood the details of the experiment.
Social psychologists approach the measurement of trust as being dependent on the
context of a relationship with an individual.15 The first part of the debrief asked subjects
to indicate the degree to which they agreed or disagreed with several statements reflecting
trust, altruism, and risk attitudes towards people. The questions asked are drawn from
the “Specific Interpersonal Trust Scale” (Johnson-George & Swap, 1982) and from the
Wrightsman (1991) “Philosophies of Human Nature Scale.” I use sliders, ranging from
1-100, to elicit responses of Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree (rather than Likert
scales) to convert responses into scales for risk tolerance, trust, and altruism scale.16 The
scores are weighted averages of the individual responses to 19 questions, while individual
scores on the relevant scale 1-100 become variables “risk tolerance score”, “trust attitude
score”, and “altruism score.” The purpose of these psychometric variables is to serve as
controls that help to disentangle the eﬀects of CMC treatments and an overall personality
disposition that might influence a trust decision.17
The demographic inquiry excludes the traditional “ethnicity” questions, replaced by a
question asking subjects to assess their skin tone using 4 tones, based on the Fitzpatrick
(1975) scale – used by Unicode developers to categorize emoji tones. The results allow
me to match reported skin tone to the choice of skin tone in emoji used in the T3.
I create a dummy variable for skin tone type, equal to one for the extreme values in
15

A common complaint about the Investment game is that it might not actually measure trust, but
rather some other thing, such as other-regarding preferences or altruism. Cox (2004, p. 358) discusses
altruism, as a possible confound, arguing that trust behavior in this game is simply “altruism plus”, once
a researcher controls for individual-level altruism. An action a Responder’s decision node is essentially
the same as the Dictator game. Also see Glaeser, Laibson, Scheinkman, and Soutter (2000) and Eckel
and Wilson (2004a, 2004b).
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The target of trust is an emerging literature. For more on this approach, see McEvily, Radzevick, and
Weber (2012).
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The Central Limit Theorem allows treatment of the data as interval data measuring a latent variable.
The validity of such measures depends on the underlying interval nature of the scale. The measures
in this study are found to be normally distributed, confirmed by Jarque-Bera tests. This allows scale
means to be compared using non-parametric tests. An alternative would be to construct a Simpson
index, but this would make interpretation complex.
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subject responses.18 Gender is indicated by a binary variable, equal to one for a female
subject. Table 1 and Figure 2 provide a breakdown of the subjects by gender and skin
tone characteristic, detailing the particularly balanced sample in this study.
Table 1: Characteristic Breakdown of Sample
Characteristic
Dark Skinned(%)
Light Skinned(%)
Total (N )

Female
61 (20.27%)
60 (19.93%)
121 (42%)

Male
72 (23.92%)
108 (35.88%)
178 (58%)

Total
133 (44.19%)
168 (55.81%)
301 (100%)

Mean Age (Std. Dev.)
Mean GPA (Std. Dev.)
Uses text chat everyday
Uses emoji everyday

20.26 (3.30)
3.66 (2.67)
0.99 (0.23)
0.87 (0.34)

20.21 (3.43)
3.38 (0.50)
0.95 (0.43)
0.73 (0.45)

20.23 (3.38)
3.49 (1.74)
0.98 (0.31)
0.83 (0.42)

Figure 2: Subjects by Group (n=301)
Because order matters, the survey questions do not include references to the game
results, gender, or skin tone until after the attitudes measures are collected. My use of
closed-form questions makes quantitative analysis easier, and the use of two open response
questions allow for qualitative and quantitative linguistic review. A single open response
question is asked to ascertain subjects’ thought processes and how the impressions of the
interaction may vary by role. Section 3.6.3 describes these responses.
Figures 3a and 3b display box plots of the psychometric results by gender and skin tone.
Mann-Whitney rank tests confirm that males report being more risk tolerant than females
18

In the scale for most questions, subjects are allowed a neutral, mid-point response and are not forced to
“agree” or “disagree.” The only exception is with the skin tone question, ensuring a light/dark delineation
for the dark skin binary variable.
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(p < 0.011). While men score slightly higher than women score on the trust scale (p <
0.034), females are more altruistic on average (p < 0.024). Dark skinned subjects report
being more risk-taking than light skinned (p < 0.029), as well as being more altruistic (p
< 0.025). One could interpret the latter result as a player having a greater overall sense
of “community”, social awareness, or fairness. In the following section, I begin a detailed
interpretation of the experimental results and test the aforementioned hypotheses.
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Figure 3: Box Plots for Psychometric Variables

(a) Psychometrics by Gender

(b) Psychometrics by Skin Tine

Results
Mean amounts sent in the baseline are $19.83 (s.e. 17.93), increasing to $35.54 (s.e.
31.99) in T2, and increasing still in T3 to 47.13 (32.79). Percentages returned increase,
but far less distinctly. The baseline level of trustworthiness is 0.749 (s.e. 0.545), which is
surprisingly high, while text chat is associated with a gain to 0.812 (s.e. 0.593). In T3, it
increases to 1.05 (s.e. 0.740) – just above the threshold for “keeping the trust” – in that
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Responders give back as much as was initially sent. These results are all significant at
the 95% level.
To support the hypothesis that there are treatment eﬀects, I must demonstrate of the
means are statistically diﬀerent from one another. Given the Nash equilibrium prediction,
these distributions should be non-normal with a skew to the zero point. Wilcoxian (MannWhitney) rank sum tests are the proper tool (reported in Table 3b). In both the text
and the emoji treatments, average trust increases relative to the baseline (significant at
the 95% and 99% level, respectively). Additionally, levels of trust between T2 and T3
are statistically diﬀerent (95%), implying that emoji may carry more weight than text
chat in the decision to trust. Mean percentages returned are only diﬀerent between the
emoji treatment and baseline (90%). Given the results of the means tests, I can reject
the null that the mean amounts sent are the same, confirming significant diﬀerences in
means between treatments for the trust variable.
Payoﬀs do increase across both treatments, indicating added surplus is associated
with CMC overall, but do not vary significantly between T2 and T3 (although payoﬀs are
slightly greater with emoji use). The reasons for the gains in each treatment, however,
may diﬀer. While welfare gains are higher in the emoji treatment than the text chat, it
is not a statistically significant diﬀerence.
The diﬀerences in the trust variable and increases in payoﬀs are more evident in
graphically, mirroring the Wilcox results. Across the treatments (Figure 5a), average
levels of trust increase steadily, as Investors sent higher amounts in T2 relative to the
baseline, and more in T3. However, reciprocation increases only in T3, which is weakly
significantly. Payoﬀs increase across treatments, at their highest in the emoji sessions.
Figure 5b breaks payoﬀs down by role and for each treatment. In this picture, it is even
more clear that while levels of trust increase across treatments, the payoﬀs to first-movers
do not. Mean payoﬀs increase sharply in both T2 and T3, indicating that trust does not
really pay for Investors – the welfare gains are being enjoyed by the Responders.
Scatterplots of dyadic actions in the game provide another look into subject behavior.
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(a) Mean Trust Variables, by Treatment and Gender

(b) Mean Trust Variables, by Treatment and Skin
Tone

Figure 4: Mean Trust Variables, by Treatment and Subject Characteristic
In the baseline treatment of 50 dyads (Figure 6a), I observe a number of zero oﬀers (84%
of the time) and an additional clustering of positive, but low, amounts sent (tending
toward the SPNE), and a spread of positive reciprocity that appears to be relative to the
amount sent – that is, more than half the returns are less that the initial amount sent, and
the percentage returned is greater for smaller oﬀers. The “fair split,” or socially eﬃcient
response (approaching 150%, indicated by the green line on the figure) is only achieved
18% of the time. The realization of the Pareto optimal strategy (100, 150) is rare, the
result of a single instance of the entire endowment being sent (2% of all actions). One
possible explanation for number of zero returns observed corresponding to low amounts
sent might be a form of negative reciprocity (i.e., punishment, such as in Rabin, 1993).
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(a) Mean Trust Variables, by Treatment

(b) Mean Payoﬀs, by role

Figure 5: Mean Trust Variables, by Treatment
Previous studies indicate that allowing communication should impact trust. Introducing text chat communication appears to increase amounts sent (Figure 6b), as they
are distributed more evenly across the endowment, while percentage returned is more
consistent for all oﬀers sent (the data points spread out laterally, with greater variance in
actions). Proportionally, there are both fewer zero amounts sent and zero returns, and I
observe the eﬃcient response of 150 only 8% of the time. There are three instances of an
Investor sending the entire endowment (12% of the time) and the Pareto optimal strategy
outcome (100, 150) occurs twice (8%).
The treatment allowing emoji exchange paints a diﬀerent picture when compared to the
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baseline (Figure 6c). There is a distinct shift of the amounts sent away in the distribution
of oﬀers away from the zero point. Even while zero oﬀers persist (in 4% of the dyads),
the spread of levels of trust concentrates toward the middle of the endowment, which
indicates that people appear willing to invest greater amounts. In a few cases, all of the
money sent is sent back for a 300% return to the Investor and a net return of zero for
the Responder.19 The percentage returned in each dyad more mimics the baseline case,
where there is a greater range of reciprocity, including higher returns for lower oﬀers. In
the emoji treatment, subjects are able to coordinate a Pareto optimal even split of the
largest pie possible more often that in the other conditions (11% of the time). The players
in this treatment achieve the socially eﬃcient level of trustworthiness 20% of the time,
reflecting a modest increase from the no communication treatment.
Gender and Skin Tone Eﬀects
A question related to my primary inquiry into the eﬀects of CMC is how certain types
of people behave and respond to the communication treatments. For example, previous
studies (e.g., Buchan et al., 2008; Eckel & Wilson, 2004a, 2006) find that females trust less
readily on average, and tend to be more trustworthy (and thus, preferable counterparts).
I predict similar diﬀerences by subject characteristics in this study. Figures 4a and 4b
give an illustrated breakdown of the eﬀects of the two treatment conditions in this study
and how they compare to the baseline of no communication.
I find evidence of group eﬀects between the baseline and CMC treatments (p- values
reported from Wilcoxian Mann-Whitney ranks tests for equality of distributions). Male
Investors send consistently more than female senders in all treatments, but the greatest
increase in trust from emojis occurs in females, where amounts sent increase from $18
to $37 on average (p < 0.002), relative to the baseline. A very similar pattern emerges
when comparing diﬀerences in regard to trust by skin tone groups. Light-skinned subjects
trust more in the text treatment compared to the baseline (p < 0.002), with significant
19

While one possible explanation for this is altruism, it is equally possible subjects hit the wrong button.
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(a) Dyad Actions, T1 (baseline)

(b) Dyad Actions, T2

(c) Dyad Actions, T3

Figure 6: Dyad Action Plots
increases from emoji (p < 0.001). Dark skinned subjects send less than those reporting
light skin in all treatments, but trust increases with emoji (by about $15, p < 0.002)
compared to the baseline.
Female Responders return more money relative to men both CMC treatments (roughly
30%, p < 0.039), suggesting that women are slightly better counterparts. Again, these
results are consistent with existing literature. Similarly, trustworthiness increases slightly
for each skin tone group. Light skinned Responders are about 30% more trustworthy
in the emoji treatment compared to having no CMC (p < 0.025), and dark skinned
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Responders return about 20% more in T3, compared to the baseline (p < 0.003). There is
no significant diﬀerence in trustworthiness between groups overall. This is heartening, in
that they are not groups of subjects identifiable as “bad partners”, meaning that certain
perceptions by Investors, driven by negative stereotypes, seems misguided.
Figures 4a and 4b also reveal the first insight into what groups of people receive
the benefits (or consequences) of trust behavior. I have shown that, overall, the bulk
of created surplus goes to Responders. However, there is evidence that some groups of
people benefit more than others. The payoﬀs for males increase in the CMC treatments
relative to the baseline. Females fare better than men in the baseline ($62 versus $80
on average. p < 0.001) and receive the most benefit in the emoji treatment (an increase
of $12 on average). Curiously, females are worse oﬀ than their male counterparts (by
roughly $10, p < 0.023) in the text-only treatment, but make up the diﬀerence with the
use of emojis. While payoﬀs increase for both skin tone groups in the emoji treatment
(the locus of the most generates surplus), dark skinned subjects received about $20 less
compared to light skinned participants (p < 0.011). These results further confirm the
hypothesis that there are diﬀerences between these groups of subjects.
Treatment Marginal Eﬀects
These results are suﬃcient to support the first set of hypotheses, but in order to gain a
richer understanding of the trust decisions in this study, it is helpful to identify the conditional determinants of trust and trustworthiness, controlling for individual attitudes and
various characteristics of the subjects. One advantage to doing this is that allows for the
possible non-random selection of subjects into sessions and treatments. To do this, I employ regression analysis across treatments, using the responses from the debriefing survey.
Table 20 summarizes the variables of interest in my analysis and highlights the determinants of trusting behavior. The dependent variables of interest are the trust measures
(amounts sent and percentage returned) and welfare (payoﬀs). The design artificially
restricts player actions to be Mi  $100 for trust, ✓  3 for Responder trustworthiness,
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and 0 for each at the bottom limit, so a Tobit model is proper. It is not necessary to use
this procedure for average payoﬀs, since it is the result of dual action, so I use OLS with
robust standard errors to estimate marginal welfare eﬀects.
Construction of a Tobit model begins with a linear specification for a desired level
of trust, meaning subjects might have intended to send a negative amount, but a zero
contribution is the only feasible action on the lower end. Similarly, if one would prefer
to give more than the endowment, that action is also not feasible in this design, so I top
code for the maximum feasible action, which is to say “This agent was willing to send
at least Mi or return at least ✓r .20 The justification for this method is that without it,
one would observe downward bias in the estimation of the trustworthiness parameter.
Therefore, adopting this model yields more accurate representation of the intent of social
behavior within the decision-making process. Because the Tobit method utilizes a nonlinearity (MLE for two-way censoring developed by Nelson, 1976), I take estimates at the
mean values of all variables to capture the marginal eﬀect for the average Investor and
Responder, weighted by the probability of censoring, but refer to them loosely as average
marginal eﬀect.
Since model top codes amounts sent (Mi ) at 100, the percent returned (✓r ) at 3,
⌧ = {100, 3}, and bottom censors at zero, the trust variable sent (what was intended to
be sent) can be expressed as
ŷi⇤ =

0

+ X1i 0 + X2i 0 + X3i 0 ⌘ + ✏i,j

(0.0.8)

where X1i contains the treatment variables, X3i is the vector of attitude controls, and
20

For clarification, see Moﬀatt (2015).

29

X3i is the vector of demographics and other controls. Amount sent is determined by
yi = 0 if yi⇤  0
yi = yi⇤ if 0 < yi⇤ < ⌧
yi = 100 if yi⇤

⌧ where ⌧ = 100

The trustworthiness variable is determined similarly, with ⌧ = 3.
Table 2 captures the Tobit regression of subject characteristics and attitude control
variables on trust variables of interest and payoﬀs. Allowing communication results in
a $16 higher average amount sent if by text, and with a $23 higher amount sent on
average if by emoji, both significant at the 95% level. When subjects report being dark
skinned or female, they appear to send $11 and $16 less on average, respectively. These
results correspond to similar experimental findings (e.g., Buchan et al., 2008; Eckel &
Wilson, 2004, 2006), in that both of these socio-demographic groups appear to trust less
on average.
One’s level of risk tolerance does not have an eﬀect on the trust decision – while
social risk is present, this is diﬀerent from the traditional notion of risk aversion and
likely incorporates notions of social attitude. A subject’s attitude toward overall societal
trustworthiness (a more trusting nature is most represented by the variable for the trust
scale and is highly correlated with the decision to trust – as one’s trust attitude score
increases 1%, there is a 0.69 percent increase in amounts sent. This is my first evidence
that CMC of any type impacts trust, controlling for a person’s overall propensity to trust.
Investors’ reported level of altruism is not correlated to the trust decision, an indication
that a higher amount sent results from something other than an expression of charity.
Focusing on the level of trustworthiness, there do not seem to be strongly significant
treatment eﬀects. Being in the T3 sessions are associated with returning about 25%
more on average than in the baseline (significant at the 90% level). While the might
be discouraging, there is positive reciprocity on average in all treatments (nearly 100%).
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Table 2: Treatment Eﬀect on Trust Variables
Variable
Text treatment (T2)
Emoji treatment (T3)
Female subjects
Dark skinned subjects
Risk tolerance score
Trust score
Altruism score
Intercept

Sent
(Std. Err.)
16.29⇤⇤⇤
(8.07)
23.71⇤⇤⇤
(6.07)
-16.03⇤⇤⇤
(5.60)
-11.12⇤⇤⇤
(5.41)
-0.09
(0.12)
0.69⇤⇤⇤
(0.18)
-0.272
(0.190)
19.22
(13.80)

Percent Ret.
(Std. Err.)
0.0041
(0.198)
0.2530⇤
(14.67)
0.0065
(0.002)
-0.0086
(0.001)
0.0043
(0.0012)
-0.0022
(0.005)
0.0021⇤⇤
(0.001)
-0.0021
(0.003)

Payoﬀ
(Std. Err.)
19.02⇤⇤⇤
(8.599)
23.13⇤⇤⇤
(0.813)
2.77
(5.990)
-4.51
(5.791)
-0.114
(0.146)
0.007
(0.215)
0.042
(0.180)
75.02⇤⇤⇤
(14.279)

151
137
301
0.038
0.013
0.150
2 /F
49.91
28.28
24.67
⇤⇤⇤ =1% los, ⇤⇤ =5% los, ⇤ =10% los
Note: Treatment eﬀects of CMC, by treatment. Estimates are measured in
experimental currency units, 10: US $1. The intercept represents the baseline.
Psychometrics reflect a 1% increase in score on relevant scale. Tobit regression
estimates reported for Columns 1 and 2. 3 observations top censored, 4 bottom
censored. Column one shows estimates for amounts sent, the trust measure.
Column 2 give estimates for the trustworthiness measure, percentage returned.
Column 3 shows OLS estimates for the welfare measure payoﬀs using robust
standard errors. The 137 Responders exclude those players that received zero
from their counterparts.
N
R2
LR

This indicates that there might be some adherence to an implicit social contract/norm
(an observance of a duty to “return the trust”). Supporting this idea is the persistence of
the altruism variable, in that each 1% increase in a subject’s altruism score corresponds
to a 0.22% increase in the percentage returned. This suggests that Responders tend to
view their actions as being altruistic – being charitable in sharing their windfall – even
though they would never have had positive surplus without the initial investment of the
first mover. This is also the first indicator that the players might view the interaction
diﬀerently their assigned role. A high degree of reciprocation overall, associated with a
high level of altruism, might be capturing a prevalence of inequality aversion.21
Access to text messaging and emoji do appear to be Pareto improving relative to
no communication. Comparing the no communication baseline to the addition of emoji
messaging, payoﬀs increase about 23%, and with the introduction of text, payoﬀs increase
21

See Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000).
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Table 3: Treatment Eﬀects for CMC on Trust, Trustworthiness, and Payoﬀs
Avg. Amount Sent:
Avg. Percentage Returned:
Avg. Payoﬀ:
Note: Means are measured in
are broken in to 150 pairs.

T1
T2
T3
19.83 (17.93)
35.541 (31.99)
47.13 (32.79)
0.749 (0.545)
0.812 (0.593)
1.05 (0.740)
71.76 (37.52)
90.51 (59.84)
94.65 (55.20)
experimental currency units, 10: US $1. 301 subjects in study

All
36.68 (31.09)
0.917 (0.671)
86.68 (51.91)

(a) Mean, Std. Dev. of Actions, Payoﬀs
Sent
Perc. Returned
Payoﬀs
Treatments
z-score
p-value
z-score
p-value
z-score
p-value
T1=T2
-2.018⇤⇤
p < 0.0404
-1.682
p < 0.093
-1.960⇤
p < 0.0499
T1=T3
-5.031⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.000
-3.469⇤⇤
p < 0.005
-2.754⇤⇤⇤
p < 0.0059
T2=T3
-2.271⇤⇤
p < 0.0487
-0.8160
p < 0.414
-0.581
p < 0.562
⇤⇤⇤ =1% los, ⇤⇤ =5% los, ⇤ =10% los
Note: Results of Wilcoxian Rank Sum hypothesis tests to compare equality of means for
trust variable distributions across treatments. 301 subjects in study broken in to 150 pairs.

(b) Wilcoxian Ranksum tests (Mann-Whitney) for Treatment Eﬀects.

$19 on average, both significant at the 1% level. The results for T3 are due the increased
number of cooperative outcomes on the gradient away from the SPNE, including the 8
Pareto Optimal (150, 150) splits.
Given the results reported in Tables 3b and 2, I find suﬃcient evidence to state that
the CMC treatments have a meaningful eﬀect on trust and on trustworthiness in T3,
while there is a weak increase in reciprocity. There are resulting welfare gains to agents in
these treatments as well, consistent with the existing literature. However, these are global
results across all participants in each of the treatments, and thus, the results only capture
the “intent to treat eﬀects”, since subjects opted into CMC, and many in the treatment
groups never utilized CMC. In the next section, I consider diﬀerences between those that
actually used CMC and those that did not.
Eﬀects of CMC in Dyads
In this section, I turn to behavior in the Investment game and compare subjects across
the CMC treatments in which communication was actually present. Recall that in T1,
subjects have no opportunity to communicate with their counterparts, and in Treatments
2 and 3, they simply have opportunity to use CMC, but are not required to send messages. Messaging is enabled for both players for the duration of the game, ending on the
Responder’s action. This means the Investor can communicate after an amount has been
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sent, but not after an amount is returned. Therefore, in order to isolate the individual
treatment eﬀects of CMC, I restrict analysis to those subjects that had the opportunity
to communicate and that took advantage of it, as compared to the baseline groups. I
create two binary dummies, each equal to one for when a dyad actually chose to send
messages with the mode respective to the assigned treatment. This reflects the eﬀects of
“treatment on the treated.”
Table 4 reports the results of Tobit regression looking at the eﬀects of the treatment
dummies and controls in a restricted sample of the groups that choose to communicate.
The results are compelling. If a dyad’s CMC is text-based, the average amount sent is
$20.55 higher than without, whereas if emoji were actually used in a dyad, the average
amount sent is $24.10 higher than without, each statistically significant (however, Wald
tests confirm they are not significantly diﬀerent from one another, with a value of p <
0.121). Amounts sent remain consistent with the prior analysis, in that a 1% increase in
one’s trust index corresponds to a $0.25 increase in amounts sent. Females send $13 less
than males on average, and those that self-report dark skin send $10 less.
Responders in dyads that used emojis returned 29% to the Investor relative to those
that used text. Trustworthiness is again associated with a subject’s level of altruism: each
1% increase in a subject’s altruism score corresponds to a 0.14% increase in reciprocation.
For instances in which CMC is actually used, payoﬀs increase by roughly $22 on average
for dyads using emoji, and $19 for dyads using text chat.
There is reason to believe that amounts passed between players driven by how they
interpret the communicative signals they receive. While in some cases, a message could
consist of a simple “thanks” or a “thumbs up” for an amount sent, in others the content is
richer. After investigating two agent level diﬀerences (gender and skin tone), I continue
to an analysis of what informational signals were used in the dyadic chat logs and how
they might drive these results.
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Table 4: CMC Eﬀects by Type on Trust, Trustworthiness, Payoﬀs
Variable
Text used in chat
Emoji used in chat
Female subjects
Dark skinned subjects
Risk tolerance score
Trust score
Altruism score
Intercept

Sent
(Std. Err.)
20.55⇤⇤⇤
(8.14)
24.11⇤⇤⇤
(5.79)
-13.13⇤⇤
(3.02)
-10.01⇤⇤
(5.22)
-0.018
(0.16)
0.71⇤⇤⇤
(0.27)
0.174
(0.24)
21.99
(12.92)

Percent Ret.
(Std. Err.)
0.169
(0.155)
0.299⇤⇤⇤
(0.133)
.0780
(0.175)
-0.073
(0.133)
0.004
(0.003)
-0.010
(0.007)
0.014⇤⇤⇤
(0.004)
0.775
(0.137)

Payoﬀ
(Std. Err.)
18.72⇤⇤
(9.80)
22.89⇤⇤⇤
(7.21)
4.15
(6.32)
-4.51
(5.79)
-0.14
(0.16)
0.03
(0.24)
0.03
(0.19)
75.82⇤⇤⇤
(16.18)

N
141
127
151
pR2
0.175
0.189
0.150
LR 2 /F
21.30
22.33
31.607
⇤⇤⇤ =1% los, ⇤⇤ =5% los, ⇤ =10% los
Note: Treatment eﬀects of CMC on the treated. Sample restricted to T2 and T3 groups
that actually used chat. Estimates are measured in experimental currency units, 10: US $1.
Psychometrics reflect a 1% increase in score on relevant scale. Tobit regression estimates
reported for Columns 1 and 2. 3 observations top censored, 4 bottom censored. Column
one shows estimates for amounts sent, the trust measure. Column 2 give estimates for
the trustworthiness measure, percentage returned. Column 3 shows OLS estimates for the
welfare measure payoﬀs using robust standard errors. The 127 Responders exclude those
players that received zero from their counterparts.

Initiation of CMC
Information should carry value to decision making agents. Given that the Investment
game mechanism is a sequential, one-shot game, the first mover is the only real “strategic” player, since the second stage resembles a Dictator game (after which the interaction
terminates). In this study, I allow communication throughout the game, until the Responder’s final action. Each player has an incentive to garner information via communication,
assuming agents condition their actions on their judgements of their otherwise anonymous
counterparts. The Investor is interested knowing something about a potential recipient,
as it may signal that person’s likelihood to reciprocate. The Responder also may be
interested in information about the Investor, in order to position herself as a trustworthy counterpart. Responders may also feel the need for information to determine the
“worthiness” of a return. The altruism score of a second-mover appears to be the driver
of percentages returned, supporting this notion. Recall, the SPNE is for there to be no
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amounts of currency passed, and increased surplus can only occur when the Investor makes
a positive oﬀer. Therefore, the value of an informational signal should be stronger for the
Investor – the more strategic player with more to lose – making conditional judgment
more pronounced the first-mover role.
In linguistics, discourse analysis aims to reveal socio-psychological characteristics of
a person by looking at the sequencing of their “words.” 22 One method is determining
which agent initiates an interaction, while another is determining how people conversationally position themselves, relative to a power diﬀerential. The sequence of responses
in a conversation typically related to who desires the discourse the most. Given that
the Responder cannot receive a positive payoﬀ without the Investor sending Mi > 0, the
first-mover in this game is in a position of power. If trust is conditioned on the information contained in a linguistic signal, it is reasonable to expect Investors to initiate more
frequently than Responders. In an attempt to elicit a signal, a researcher might expect
to see them “talk” first.
In order to test this hypothesis, I restrict analysis to T2 and T3, look at the time stamp
of an initial message sent, then determine the role of the initiating agent. I designate
binary variables, equal to one for being the initiator and being an Investor, respectively.
In Table 5, I report marginal eﬀects from a probit regression for the probability of being
the initiating agent, conditional on the assigned treatment for a player (p scores from a
Chow test comparing coeﬃcients are included).
Estimated at means for all variables, the model predicts that Investor initiate communication in the text treatment 31% more often than second-movers, while Investors are
45% more likely to initiate than Responders in the emoji treatment. The most pronounced
eﬀect occurs in T3 (p < 0.001), where the potential signaling content in emoji may be
greater. Additionally, the relationship between the trust scale variable is negative and
significant –as propensity to trust increases, the likelihood of initiating CMC decreases.
22

In this context, “words” can mean any verbal or paralinguistic cue – spoken, texted, emoji, gestures,
etc.
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I interpret these results to mean that overall, Investors appear to believe that initiating
communication – and the potential resulting information has value.
Table 5: Conditional Likelihood of Initiating CMC, T2 and T3
Variable

T2
T3
Chow test (T2=T3)
(Std. Err.)
(Std. Err.)
Investors
0.307 ⇤⇤⇤
0.451⇤⇤⇤
p<0.001
(0.119)
(0.089)
Dark skinned subjects
-0.089
-0.148⇤
p<0.001
(0.078)
(0.088)
Female subjects
-0.262⇤⇤⇤
-0.002
p<0.001
(0.077)
(0.056)
Risk tolerance score
0.004
0.006
p<0.334
(0.003)
(0.004)
Trust score
-0.004⇤⇤
-0.004⇤⇤
p<0.940
(0.001)
(0.001)
Altruism score
0.001
0.001
p<0.703
(0.002)
(0.002)
Intercept
-2.42⇤⇤⇤
-2.14⇤⇤⇤
p<0.055
(0.124)
(0.192)
N
50
151
2 /F
28.024
30.023
⇤⇤⇤ =1% los, ⇤⇤ =5% los, ⇤ =10% los
Note: Probit regression estimates reported for columns 1 and 2 for the likelihood
a player initiated chat, and are marginal eﬀects taken at means. The primary
variable of interest is a binary indicator of whether the player was the Investor.
Psychometric variables reflect a 1% increase in score on relevant scale. Column
1 shows estimates for initiation of communication in T2. Column 2 shows estimates for initiation of communication in T3. Column 3 shows p-scores from
Chow estimates comparing estimates between the columns.

Females, who tend to trust less often on average, appear to initiate CMC less often
by 26.2% in T2, but there is no gender diﬀerence in the emoji treatment. I take this
observation to mean that females are less willing to explore the trust decision, or might
be reluctant to allow themselves to be deceived (at least when using text). The concept of
strategic ignorance might explain this, in the case one commits to a lack of information,
hoping to avoid being taken advantage of, or intending to avoid errors in judgement – even
when use of CMC is fairly costless. Yet, this likelihood disappears in the emoji treatment.
This suggests that female subjects are more willing to initiate when the informational
content comes from emoji, rather than text. Another explanation is that females are
more adept at, or comfortable with, using emoji.23 The results make sense in that if one
23

Witmer and Katzman (1997) provide some evidence to suggest that women use more emoticons than
men in CMC. By analyzing emoji use on a Twitter corpus, Bamman, Eisenstein, and Schnoebelen (2014)
find that use of emoji varies by geography, age, gender, and social class in a similar manner to dialects
or regional accents. This implies that both use and interpretation matter in such an exchange.
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believes that trust is warranted, they would be less likely to elicit information about their
counterpart. The psychometric measures may reflect subjects’ attitudes toward “social
risk” with respect to strangers.24 These findings are more consistent with a demand-side
story than a supply, in that, the signaling value of communication is more important to
the first movers and they act more readily than the Responders in order to gain that
information. An alternative hypothesis for these observed sequencing is that Investors
know that they have the first actions in the game, and therefore also perceive a cognitive
imperative – are primed – to be the leader in discourse (by the nature of their first-mover
status in the game).25 While this is a feasible explanation, there is no way to test these
competing theories with the data. The rules of the game do not require communication
in either treatment, so I argue that the opportunity cost of starting the chat indicates
which agents values the information the most, and that the initiation of communication
is elicitation of signaling information.
I take these results as evidence that there exists relevant signaling content in messages
passed and that this information is important. But what are the drivers of these changes?
If people in the communication treatments are trusting at higher and similar rates, then
it is reasonable to believe that the components of that discourse are the determinants.
In the next two sections, I look at treatment eﬀects for each mode of communication in
order to gain insight into what characteristics of language lead to trusting, starting with
analysis of the text chat in T2. Then, I look at the eﬀect of receiving certain types of
emoji on subject behavior in T3.
Linguistic Analysis of Text Chat Treatment T2
The main purpose of the experimental design was to isolate the eﬀects of emoji in trust.
In previous studies, the value of communication is to establish intent, possibly in the form
of a promise or “terms” of a prospective split. However, a basic analysis of the text chat
24
25

For more on the intuition behind this, see Eckel and Wilson, (2004a, 2004b).
Psychological priming is commonly reported in economic experiments. Cohn and Maréchal (2016)
provide a survey.
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treatment will add some depth to that notion, since terms often include words signaling
emotion or social attitudes. To look at the role of specific aspects of text on the trust
decision, I take the data from the chat logs and apply linguistic analysis in two ways.
Following Charness and Dufwenberg (2006) and the natural language classification
method similar to that detailed in Houser and Xiao (2011), I employed 57 student evaluators at a rate of $1 per chat to individually classify the content in each dyad’s chat log (23
in total) by whether a “promise” is either implied or explicitly stated. If each evaluator
selected the classification that the majority agreed upon for 2 randomly selected chat
logs, the evaluator received an additional dollar bonus. If a majority of evaluators agreed
that a deal has been agreed upon in a given dyad’s chat log, I assign a binary variable
promise (equal to 1) to that dyad. This will allow me to see the eﬀect of the deal on
trust and payoﬀs, and help diﬀerentiate the text treatment eﬀects from those in the emoji
treatment.
Additionally, the words used in each dyad’s chat log are analyzed using a Content
Analysis software package, Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count 2015 (LIWC).26 This software counts the total number of words used in a pair’s interaction, categorizes them based
on a dictionary data base, and then scores word as a percentage of all words used by category. Many words fit multiple categories. Certain word groups that relate to social groups
(“we” versus “I”), as well as those referencing aﬀect or identity, may impact actions in the
game. The output from the software allows exploration of correlation of word groups with
individual-level diﬀerences in trust and trustworthiness. I then regress the trust variables
on the percentage used for each word category.27 .
Table 6 documents Tobit regression results on the trust variables. Because the sample
size is small, a number of explanatory variables are highly collinear and subsequently
dropped from the analysis. However, there are some significant correlations between
word type and trust. “Cognitive” words are positively associated with higher amounts sent,
26

For psychometric foundations, see Tausczik and Pennebaker (2010).

27

A similar method is found in Chen and Chen (2011) and Abatayo et al. (2015)
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suggesting that words indicating higher processing lead to higher amounts sent. This most
likely reflects the opportunity cost of trusting for the Investor. A high percentage of terms
related to “social process” words like “discussion” are associated with to increased amounts
sent, an intuitive finding (95% los). Mentioning “money” or “payoﬀs” is weakly associated
with increased trust, perhaps a framed incentive for a counterpart to take socially risky
action (90% los). Aﬀective words also have weak eﬀects on trust and trustworthiness,
consistent with their valence. Overall, communication did not significantly improve the
percentage returned by Responders. The word content variables apply to both parties in
a given pair, and while I include them for the amounts sent and percentage returned (to
reflect the possible impact on actions) I exclude them from the payoﬀs regression (Column
3) for ease of interpretation. individual role. Because the role of the causal role of the
above word categories is hard to define for payoﬀs (since this is not characterized by role),
I create binary variable for “aﬀective or social text used”, equal to one if any such words
are found in a dyad’s chat log. This reflects the eﬀect of any of these word types on trust
variables. This is done to simplify interpretation of the payoﬀ coeﬃcient, since the words
types are not categorized by role.
The “promise” variable has a significant eﬀect on both trust variables and increased
payoﬀs, as welfare increases by 13% when such accords are stuck. I interpret this part
of eﬀect in T2 as much of the literature has, in that the ability to use CMC allows for
“cheap talk” increasing trust and welfare gains from bargaining content, deals that are
ultimately keep due to “guild aversion” (Charness & Dufwenberg, 2006). However, in this
study, another component is the type of words used in messaging. Using these social or
emotional words increases payoﬀs for the average player by 16%.
Further qualitative analysis on the chat logs reveals that there is very little talk about
identity, although a few instances of screening do occur (including two instances in which
a detailed description of the counterpart is requested prior to action). Agents spend more
time chatting about bargaining strategies than one another. However, this makes sense
because texting is costly (in terms of eﬀort and time expired). Given these observations,
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Table 6: Marginal Eﬀects on Trust Variables, T2, by Word Type
Variable
I, me

Sent
(Std. Err.)
-0.84⇤
(0.50)

Percent Ret.
(Std. Err.)
-0.026
(0.028)

We, us

1.21⇤⇤⇤
(0.58)

0.277
(0.232)

Social words used

0.51⇤⇤⇤
(0.18)

0.085⇤⇤
(0.042)

Altruism words used

1.60
(1.92)

-0.038
(0.169)

Positive words used

0.26⇤⇤
(0.13)

0.051⇤
(0.028)

Negative words used

-1.40⇤⇤
(0.72)

-0.017
(0.019)

Cognitive words used

0.60⇤⇤
(0.82)

-0.111
(0.119)

Promises/deals made

8.56⇤⇤⇤
(3.45)

0.121⇤⇤⇤
(0.041)

Payoﬀs
(Std. Err.)

12.43⇤⇤⇤
(0.42)
16.43⇤⇤⇤
(7.24)

Aﬀective or social text used in chat
-10.60⇤⇤
(5.13)

-0.362
(0.211)

-5.97
(6.14)

⇤⇤

-24.95
(13.33)

0.103
(0.201)

-8.41
(12.22)

Risk tolerance score

0.09
(0.34)

0.730
(0.511)

-0.22
(0.41)

Trust score

0.45⇤⇤⇤
(0.10)

Altruism score

-0.61
(0.57)

Dark skinned subjects
Female subjects

Intercept
N
R2
LR

2

29.12⇤⇤⇤
(31.24)
25
0.147
22.12

0.035
(0.82)

0.079
(0.073)

0.014⇤⇤⇤
(0.006)

0.018
(0.017)

0.039⇤⇤⇤
(0.457)

99.05⇤⇤⇤
(46.28)⇤

23
0.168
23.24

50
0.204
24.20

/F
=1% los, ⇤⇤ =5% los, ⇤ =10% los
Note: Tobit regression estimates reported for columns 1 and 2. 2 observations top censored, 2 bottom
censored. Estimates are measured in experimental currency units, 10:US $1. Psychometric variables reflect
a 1% increase in score on relevant scale. Column 1 shows estimates for amounts sent, the trust measure.
Column 2 give estimates for the trustworthiness measure, percentage returned. Column 3 shows OLS
estimates for the welfare measure payoﬀs using robust standard errors. The promise variable is binary,
representing acknowledgement of non-binding oﬀer. The word types are categorized from chat log data
complied during the Investment game interaction in T2, and were analyzed using LIWC2015 software.
Each word type describes marginal eﬀect of a 1% change in single word type used in a dyad. A total of
754 words were used by 25 Investors and 24 Responders. The 23 Responders exclude those players that
received zero from their counterparts.
⇤⇤⇤
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I proceed to analysis of the emoji treatment to test the hypotheses that certain emoji
types have an eﬀect on trust.
Analysis of Emoji Treatment T3: Emoji as Signals
In the previous sections, I presented evidence that introducing emojis to laboratory Investment games increases trust, allows for welfare gains, and has informational value for
the trust decision. In this section, the goal is to identify driving factors that underlie
the results in the treatment eﬀects analysis. In particular, what emoji types have an
eﬀect on trust variables and overall welfare. My hypothesis is that by using emoji-based
CMC, agents are passing informational signals between one another in an attempt to
influence trust or reciprocity, and diﬀerent emoji signals will have distinct eﬀects on the
trust variables.
There are studies that support this suspicion. Building on the seminal work of Ekman,
experimental work in neuroscience indicates that another’s facial expression is a dominant social cue that can bias interpersonal trust (see Dong, Li, & Sun, 2014 and Yuasa,
Saito, & Mukawa, 2006). In experimental economics, Eckel and Wilson (2004b) provide
insight into how this might impact the trust relationship, using “friendliness icons” as
stylized proxies for face to face interaction. They observe that subjects in trust games
prefer friendlier partners and find evidence that stereotypes based on physical characteristics (sex, ethnicity, age) often aﬀect expectations about future behavior, while facial
expressions may provide emotional insight into a partner’s likely actions.
In this study, I predict that aﬀective content (such as a smiling emoji) will aﬀect
amounts passed between counterparts. Additionally, using the results in Eckel and Wilson
(2004b) and Buchan et al. (2008) as intuition, I expect that receipt of an emoji that is
perceived as coming from a female counterpart to have a positive eﬀect on amounts sent
and returned. Or, as suggested in Eckel and Wilson (2006), if one receives an emoji that
has been modified to depict a dark skin tone, this might have a negative eﬀect on the
trust variables of interest. This underscores the point that emojis carry informational and
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strategic value and should aﬀect the trust decision.
In order to isolate these eﬀects, I again exploit the chat logs from the third treatment,
and search for instances of players receiving emoji that they might reasonably perceive
as signals of emotional or identifying content. What is common to these signals, even
if noisy, is that agents may condition their actions on their beliefs about, or stereotypes
associated with, their counterparts. I am interested the types of emoji received, the eﬀect
of receiving a particular signal, and how this diﬀers by role and identity of a player. The
first step in this decomposition is the classification of the emoji signals received by players.
Emoji Signal Classification Method
It is first necessary to break the emoji found in the chat logs into general content categories.
I do this by categories that correspond to our subject variables for female, skin tone,
and classify emojis by their aﬀective valence (positive or negative emotion). I am only
interested in a single occurrence of each possible signal being received, and only in the
signal being received prior to a player choosing an action. This assumes that once an
emoji signal has been received, its informational content does not diminish. While the
choice of emoji is costless in dollar terms, there is a small time and cognitive cost that
come with choosing one.
Psycholinguists have focused on the emotional dimensionality of emoticons/emojis and
their role in message interpretation. While emoji are traditionally considered as politeness
indicators, emotional cues, and positioning devices, the feasibility of emoji as answer categories for questions aiming at socio-cognitive processes and emotional expression states
has been established.28
To classify emojis received into binary variable for aﬀective content, I adopt results
from Novak, Smailović, Sluban, and Mozetič (2015), a well-known computational linguistics article that utilizes content analysis from 83 human annotators to classify emoji found
in 1.6 million tweets. Using their scale of sentiment polarity (with a neutral 0 point), I
28

See Bunz and Campbell (2004), Graham (2015), and Crystal (2004).
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classify each emoji used in this study as a “positive signal” or “negative signal”, binary
variables equaling 1 if the sentiment score is greater than one standard deviation from
neutral in a particular direction on this scale. For example, the “Laughing with Tears
of Joy” emoji (the most commonly used emoji in the world in 2015 according to Emojitracker.com) rated 0.890 on the sentiment polarity scale, and was coded as the binary
variable positiveemoji. One downside of the Novak scale is that there is positive bias,
in that a disproportionate amount of the coded emojis are considered to imply positive
sentiment.
Skin tone markers are a fairly recent development in emoji, allowing users modify emoji
with one of five skin tones taken from the Fitzpatrick scale, which has 5 ranges from “very
light” to “very dark”. Any emojis that do not use a tone modifier appear yellow, a default
condition I take as neutral. As with the skin tone in the debriefing survey, emoji are
broken into two categorical variables, “dark emoji signal” and “light emoji signal”, equal
to one if they occur, and equal to zero if an emoji is yellow. I argue that these are signals,
in that the player, at some point, would have had to actively choose to switch from the
default yellow, at a small cost.
The beliefs of players based on the possible gender orientation of an emoji is more
problematic. To date, there is no formalized study that uses content analysis to classify
emoji by the perception of whether the came from a female or male. In computational
linguistics, it is argued that the linguistic features of male and female users in the dyadic
synchronous CMC is similar to that in face-to-face conversations, while some of the features may be aﬀected by the communication mode. Mei (2006) finds that it is possible
to identify the gender of the speakers by their use of cues in conversations – be it verbal
cues, cues in text, or paralinguistic symbols (emojis).
The perception of gender is essential to my analysis. To classify the emojis in this
study, I follow the Houser and Xiao (2011) natural language classification method by
setting up a coordination game for content categorization.29 I recruited a total of 120
29

A more detailed account is documented in the following chapter.
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evaluators from the general student population using SONA scheduling software. These
subject participated in an experimental labor market, executed with assistance from the
Customer NeuroInsights Research Laboratory (CNRL) at The University of Memphis.
Subjects completed a gender classification task (conducted on Qualtrics) that was used
to ensure objective classification of emoji according to an existing social norm. Subjects
in this design were only told that others would be completing the same task, but nothing
about the composition of the evaluator group. Student evaluators were instructed:
“Imagine you have received an emoji from someone you do not know. For each
of the emoji pictographs, please classify the sender of the image as more likely
to be male, more likely female, or neutral (no overall gender association). Pick
what you think most people in the study would pick. ”
120 emoji were to be classified, including the 100 most commonly used emoji (according
to Emojitracker.com) and 20 lesser known emoji that were used in T3. Of these, 47
were given the designation “female emoji signal” or “male emoji signal”. Evaluators were
incentivized with the oﬀer of $5 gift card for classifying a number of randomly chosen
emoji in the same way as the majority of the other evaluators. The result of gender
identification task shows that indeed certain emoji may be commonly believed to identify
the gender of the sender. However, this says nothing about whether message readers are
correct in their beliefs. For this study, normative beliefs about the origin of a signal are
suﬃcient. There was no significant diﬀerence in assessment by evaluator gender. To my
knowledge, this method has not been used before to classify emoji in any capacity.
In many cases, the full method allows for categorization into multiple categories for
a single emoji. For example, a light skinned “thumbs up” emoji would be coded as both
“positive emoji signal” and “light emoji signal”. This means that interaction eﬀects are
greatly complicated due to collinearity. Of those subjects that actually use emoji, a total
of 521 emoji are received between 78 matched pairs, with an average of 3.317 used per
person (s.d. 2.396). Only four pairs choose not to use any emoji. Using the above
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Table 7: Subject Characteristics, Signals received by Role in T3
Characteristic
Dark Skinned (%)
Light Skinned (%)
Total (N )

Female
32 (20.25%)
28 (17.72%)
60 (38%)

Male
44 (27.85 %)
54 (34.18%)
98 (62%)

Total
76 (48.10%)
82 (51.90%)
158 (100%)

Mean Age (Std. Dev.)
Mean GPA (Std. Dev.)
Uses text everyday
Uses emoji everyday

20.40 (3.97)
3.91 (0.77)
0.99 (0.23)
0.89 (0.31)

20.34 (4.18)
3.35 (0.48)
0.97 (0.43)
0.75 (0.61)

20.34 (4.085)
3.56 (2.35)
0.98 (0.21)
0.85 (0.42)

(a) Characteristics of Subjects in T3
Emoji Signal Received
Dark Skinned
Light Skinned
Male
Female
Positive Sentiment
Negative Sentiment
Total

by Investor
17
38
9
19
54
17
154

by Responder
21
19
7
21
35
12
115

Total
38
57
16
40
89
29
269

(b) Instances of Emoji Signal Content by Role in T3

classification, these translate to 281 instances of a particular emoji signal type being
received by a player prior to action, broken down in Table 7b.
Eﬀects of Emoji on Trust
To determine the eﬀects of emoji signals, I restrict analysis to the actual “treated” subjects
found in dyads that opted to use emoji, but the trade oﬀ is a diminished sample size. A
post hoc power test confirms that the 158 subjects across 2 roles in T3 is above the lower
threshold for significance with power = 0.8 and ↵ = 0.05.
Table 7a provides a breakdown of the basic characteristics of the subjects in the
restricted T3 sample, which is especially balanced and diverse. A concern in other studies
is generalizability of the sample. 60 of the total 158 subjects are female (38%), and 76
subjects reported having dark skin (48.10%). Especially relevant to this analysis, 98%
of the subjects reported using electronic messaging every day, and 85% reported using
emoji in messaging every day. Eighty-six percent of these subjects reported using a mobile
device with an Apple operating system.30
30

To minimize measurement error, the two instances of cross-platform matches involving emoji use were
excluded from the analysis.
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Given the classification method used in the previous section, I include a breakdown of
the instances of signal by role (Figures 7a and 7b) to give a sense of who has received what
information in the sample, by frequency. There is no guarantee that any initiated conversation will get a response. Such is the case in only a few instances. One key observation
is that the number of “positive” emojis received is quite large relative to others. This is
part due to coding of “polite” gestures that are commonly used to initiate conversation.
Additionally, I am making the assumption that a signal does not not depreciate. For
example, if an Investor receives an emoji indicative of a dark skinned counterpart, this
information is persistent and not updated. The frequency of certain emoji types suggests
that the Responders are readily oﬀering signals (intentionally or not), which is sensible
if they perceive that this information is important to the first mover and hope to impact
the amount of money sent. Light skinned emoji are more prevalent than dark, which is
curious since the distribution of skin tone in subjects is balanced.
As a first step towards establishing that players pick up on identifying signals in emoji
content, all subjects were asked, “To what degree were you able to determine identifying
characteristics about your counterpart? For example, did you have reason to suspect your
counterpart was female or of a particular ethnic group?” In T3, the emoji treatment, the
average response was 42% on a scale of 1-100. This compared to average responses in
T1 of 1% and 12% in T2 indicates that there was a significant diﬀerence in one’s belief
about a counterpart in the emoji treatment versus the baseline (p < 0.001) and the text
treatment (p < 0.002).
The next step in determining what signals matter is to find the marginal eﬀects of the
emoji dummies and compare them to the eﬀects of subject type and psychometrics. Table
21 lists a summary of the T3 (restricted sample) statistics for the variables used in this
analysis.31 I again use a two-limit Tobit model for the trust variables, as in the previous
section, top coding amounts sent at 100, and percentages returned at 3, ⌧ = {100, 3}, and
31

Due to the restricted size of the sample, a number of interaction terms were dropped due to either
collinearity or non-significance. The only exception is an interaction dark*female, used in a univariate
conditional probit as an indication of that group’s likelihood to trust.

46

(a) Emoji Signals Received by Gender

(b) Emoji Signals Received by Skin Tone

Figure 7: Instances of Emoji Signals Received
bottom censoring each at zero. So, the model becomes
ŷi⇤ =

0

+ X1i 0 + X2i 0 + X3i 0 ⌘ + ✏i,j

(0.0.9)

where X1i is the vector of emoji observations, X2i is the vector of attitude controls, and
X3i is the vector of demographics and other controls
and where the censoring limits are the same as the model in the previous section.
Table 8 reports Tobit regression results from the T3 emoji treatment and OLS estimates for welfare. The primary dependent variables of interest, amounts sent and percentage returned, are impacted by a number of emoji factors. Most prominently, trust
is negatively associated with reception of a dark skinned emoji, as this reduces amounts
sent by more than $19 on average, a result consistent with findings in both Wilson and
Eckel (2006) and Fershtman and Gneezy (2001) regarding statistical discrimination in
bargaining games. This is a stark reminder of negative stereotypes associated with social
situations and behavioral judgement. Given the balanced distribution by skin tine in the
sample, one might expect one group of subjects to be driving this result.
However, restricting the sample again to only include subjects reporting dark skin, the
negative eﬀect of a dark emoji on trust is persistent (with $27 being sent). This suggests
that the eﬀect is common across both skin tone groups, a finding that conflicts with many
studies on in group/out group cooperation. Nevertheless, there is some indication that
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dark skinned females drive a large part of this result (Table 9). To gain some insight, I
create an interaction variable dark*female. In a simple probit (at mean of $47 sent), I find
that conditional on receiving a dark emoji, dark skinned females are less likely to send
money than dark skinned males (-0.004, s.e. 0.0015). However, because of the degrees of
freedom allowed in the restricted sample, I caution the reader to take this result with a
grain of salt.
When an Investor is faced with a female-oriented emoji, trust increases by $20 (significant at the 99% level), a substantial amount. This observation the gender identity of the
signal received seem to support the narrative put forth by Eckel and Wilson (2004a) and
Buchan et al. (2008), proposing that because females are more trustworthy on average,
they are preferred counterparts and therefore receive more. Thus, this might be another
example of statistical discrimination on the part of first movers – positive in this case –
even though females only return a little more than males.
As expected, positive and negative sentiment are correlated with trust. The Investor
sends $5 more (95%) when receiving an emoji with positive aﬀective content. This eﬀect is
consistent with the psychology literature on facial expression, but is also consistent with
the “politeness indicator” interpretation found in current linguistic theory. Receiving
negative sentiment (such as a “disdainful” emoji) results in $24 less sent (99%), also
predictable and possibly interpreted as “deals gone bad.” Again, the agent’s trust index
score is positively related to trust behavior in the game ($0.56 more is sent for every 1%
increase).
Another observation that supports the informational value hypothesis is that being
female or dark skinned is no longer negatively correlated with trust. Since these were
significant in the previous regressions, one possibility is that the informational signals in
emoji have aﬀected the judgement of the people in those groups such that they feel more
comfortable in trusting their counterpart. However, another might be that these groups
were naturally more engaged with the game – more playful – with addition of emoji chat,
and that the information eﬀect is not causal.
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Table 8: Marginal Eﬀects on Trust Decisions, T3, by Emoji Type
Variable
Received light emoji
Received dark emoji
Received male emoji

Sent
(Std. Err.)
8.84
(10.52)
-19.21⇤⇤⇤
(8.98)
-9.11
(12.59)

Percent Ret.
(Std. Err.)
0.026
(0.278)

Payoﬀ
(Std. Err.)

-0.277
(0.332)
0.337
(0.399)

Received female emoji

20.21⇤⇤⇤
(7.89)

0.085
(0.120)

Received positive emoji

5.26⇤⇤
(2.53)

0.215⇤
(0.124)

Received negative emoji

-23.60⇤⇤
(9.92)

-0.387⇤⇤
(0.169)

Emoji signal used in chat

16.43⇤⇤⇤
(7.24)

Dark skinned subject

-0.77
(18.13)

-0.362
(0.211)

-11.07⇤⇤⇤
(4.14)

Female subject

-5.95
(13.53)

0.103
(0.201)

4.41⇤⇤
(2.22)

Risk tolerance score

-0.15
(0.36)

0.730
(0.511)

0.02
(0.51)

Trust score

0.56⇤⇤⇤
(0.23)

Altruism score

-0.29
(0.57)

Intercept

44.12⇤⇤⇤
(22.24)

0.035
(0.82)

0.132⇤⇤⇤
(0.053)

0.014⇤⇤⇤
(0.006)

0.018
(0.017)

0.039⇤⇤⇤
(0.457)

89.05
(26.28)⇤

N
74
71
151
R2
0.187
0.198
0.194
LR 2 /F
21.12
23.24
18.20
⇤⇤⇤
=1% los, ⇤⇤ =5% los, ⇤ =10% los
Note: Treatment eﬀects of CMC on the treated. Sample restricted to
T3 groups that actually used emoji. Psychometric variables reflect
a 1% increase in score on relevant scale. Tobit regression estimates
reported for columns 1 and 2. 3 observations top censored, 5 bottom
censored. Estimates are measured in experimental currency units,
10: US $1. Column 1 shows estimates for amounts sent, the trust
measure. Column 2 give estimates for the trustworthiness measure,
percentage returned. Column 3 shows OLS estimates for the welfare
measure payoﬀs using robust standard errors. The 71 Responders
exclude those players that received zero from their counterparts.
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Table 9: Likelihood Subject is Dark Skinned Female by Amount Sent
Variable (dy/dx, at mean 47.11)
Sent
Intercept

Coeﬃcient
(Std. Err.)
-0.004⇤⇤
(0.002)
-0.178
(0.282)

N
Log-likelihood

32
-35.924
8.217

2
(1)
⇤⇤⇤

=1% los, ⇤⇤ =5% los, ⇤ =10% los
Note: Probit regression estimates conditional on receiving a dark emoji. Estimated at mean amount
sent of $47.11

I have demonstrated that are significant relationships between the level of trust extended and certain types of emoji. In contrast, the behavior of Responders is not strongly
aﬀected by viewing the photos of their counterparts: Responders do not send back substantially more when emoji are received. Only the emotional signals have a weak eﬀect on
trustworthiness. Positive sentiment is associated with 21% more returned, while receipt of
a negative signal is not conducive to trustworthiness, as 38% less on average is returned.
A subject’s level of altruism is still a significant driver of the decision to reciprocate – for
a 1% increase one the altruism scale there is a 1.4% increase in percentages returned.
Adding the emoji dummies, I find that the attitude eﬀects remain as before, but the
demographic indicator variables lose their significance. This is intriguing, and supports the
notion that agents are getting information that makes them more trusting. Emoji use has
a significant eﬀect on overall payoﬀs. Simply being in a dyad that uses any combination
of signaling emoji resulted in gains of $16 on average. Women receive higher gains than
men, over $4 more on average, the result of the positive eﬀects of the female emoji and
being perceived as better partners. Conversely, dark skinned individuals appear to be
paying a penalty, as their gains are $11 lower on average than light skinned participants.
This appears to be the unfortunate result of a negative stereotype: as trust decreases with
a dark skin signal, so do payoﬀs for those that send such signal.
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One potential concern in the regression results is that in order to establish a causal
relationship, one must assume the emoji signals are correlated with the trust variable of
interest and not the error term. Because the binary dummies for the emoji signal types
are taken from data that are collected over the duration of the agents’ interaction, there
could be an endogeneity issue. This may be the case if players condition the emoji they
send on the signals they have previously received. Choosing to position one’s self relative
to the information one has about a counterpart – a form of mimicry – is discussed in
psycholinguistic literature (Graham, 2015). Subjects may choose to strategically “switch”
their identities, given what they know about a partner or the distribution of groups in the
subject pool (such as a dark skinned subject strategically choosing to use a light skinned
emoji). While detecting this frequency is not an advantage of the design, Pearson r
correlations in Table 22 give no indication that such behavior is a problem. It is likely
that subjects are aware that judgments might be made on the basis of skin tone (as
evidenced in the literature), and have an incentive to represent themselves in a manner
that they think best elicits trust. In this study, the sample size and existing controls do
not grant enough power to do proper analysis of mimicry.
To summarize this treatment analysis, there is no evidence that investors are adept at
gauging the trustworthiness of Responders from their emoji exchanges, but people appear
to pay attention to the type of emoji signals sent to them, and the information provided to
Investors does impact the trust decision in diﬀerent ways. As a result, there are winners
and losers from the signals in emoji.
Role Analysis
The purpose of this final analysis is to shed light on the trust motivations and potential
eﬀects of normative views by role. While altruism has become a usual suspect in this study,
a possible motivation for trustworthiness is suggested by a growing literature concerning
the influence of norms on reciprocal behavior. Because social norms are internalized, they
are a reasonable motivating factor for actions. Following Eckel and Wilson (2004a), I
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approach eliciting the normative views of the game using linguistic analysis.
Subjects were asked an open-ended question on the debriefing survey:
“We are very interested in what you thought the decision problem was about.
Please tell us what kind of situation in your life you think it is about or describe
your thought process.”
I apply LWIC2015 software to the text responses, which counts and codes subjects’ responses by topic and specific word types (Table 10 lists a subset of coded responses as
percentage of total words used, by role). This coding gives us the opportunity to analyze
separately the relationship between risk attitudes and trust for diﬀerent perceptions of
the game.
I observe positive correlations between these responses, attitude variables, and roles in
the Investment game. About 5% of the total word count (3974) of first-movers mention
“trust” explicitly, compared to less than 2% of second-movers’ words (3382). Investors also
use “risk-oriented” words far more often that Responders (7% compared to 1.7%). This
interesting, since the risk tolerance measures were not significant for players in either
roles. Second-movers use “altruistic-oriented words” (such as “help ” and “nice”) more
often, and “comparing” words readily, which mirrors the marginal eﬀects of the altruism
index variable. Responders tend to see sending currency back as being nice or generous
– the driver of the non-strategic Dictator game – rather than fulfilling a norm of positive
reciprocity (i.e. trustworthiness).
While altruism is a pro-social behavior, an altruistic agent gains utility by increasing
another’s surplus, whereas with positive reciprocity, the agent sends a return out of a
sense of obligation. Perhaps more telling, the use of plural pronouns “we, us” is the
nearly exclusive domain of the Investors (10% of all words used). More “emotional” and
“cognitive” words are used by Investors also, perhaps indicating the psychological costs
of the trust decision and related strategies. Responders use “I” and “me” nearly twice
as often as Investors, again a hint second-movers might see their role as “benevolent” or
ensuring “fairness”, rather than one of reciprocation for an implied social contract. Given
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Table 10: Linguistic Analysis of Answers to #34, by Role
Total Number Words

Investors (n = 152)
3974

Responders (n = 146)
3382

Type
Percent of Total
Percent of Total
Trust, trusting, etc.
5.92
1.95
Risk (stock market, loans, etc.)
7.01
1.77
Altruistic words (nice, help, etc.), etc.
4.01
6.28
Social words (fair, reciprocate, etc.)
12.86
9.96
Comparing words
2.12
4.02
Rewards, money, profit
6.62
4.02
Cognitive Processes
23.11
13.23
Positive emotion
4.86
3.47
Negative emotion
2.28
1.66
Curse words, swearing
1.35
0.06
We, us
10.12
0.75
I, me
5.11
9.16
Note: The table details words used by subjects in all treatments to describe the
Investment game interaction. All words used were analyzed using LIWC2015
software. Total number of words counted are broken down by role: 3974 by 152
Investors, 3382 by 146 Responders. Words are reported as percent of total used,
by role. Numerous word types were dropped due to collinearity, the result of
multiple categories for words.

these insights, it appears that Investors and Responders view the game diﬀerently and
react to the perception of what they might be expected to do in their assigned role.
Conclusion
Both parties in a dyadic trust relationship have important strategic considerations. The
first-mover’s problem is deciding is whether (or how much) to trust the Responder. The
Responder’s problem is deciding, conditional on being trusted, whether and how much to
reciprocate. Each party, but especially the first-moving Investor, makes decisions based
on expectations about the other. a priori beliefs typically guide these expectations, but
so does any information obtained. Informational content (via communication) should be
more valuable to the more strategic player – the truster. This insight allows one to explore
an agent’s willingness to exchange information in the form of CMC and the eﬀect of an
emoji type on decisions. One’s choice of electronic “words” is inexorably linked to the
“self” they choose project to another, and such projections influence economic actions.32
The goal of this experiment was to identify how the incorporation of emoji can aﬀect
32

How one opts to project a “personae” is essential to understanding how people form relationships. This
linguistic relationality is the determinant of social distance between individuals or groups, while its
foundation the situational “degree of alignment” with others (Graham, 2015), and such an alignment is
relative to whom one expects the receiver to be.
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trust behavior, compare welfare gains across CMC types, and identify types of informational content and personal characteristics that influence the decision to trust. Using an
innovative laboratory experiment, linguistic analysis and a novel classification game, I
show that levels of trust and payoﬀs increase with the inclusion of electronic messaging
and emoji in trust games. There are three main takeaways from this inquiry. First, communication is essential to economic trust, however, the type of this interaction – be it in
the form of face to face discourse, hand-written words, text messaging, and emoji. Like
those of many other studies, my findings suggest traditional economic theory requires
revision for it to be predictive of behavior in situations where communication and trust
coexist. Because emojis have distinct content embedded in them, they have a strong eﬀect
on trust and the distribution of welfare gains. My results illustrate the possible impact
of a generational sea change. CMC, with emoji a pervasive element, induces individuals
to cooperate with and trust one another. This shift is important and researchers should
expect the eﬀects of CMC to persist throughout economic exchanges. The current state of
the world sees toddlers being given iPads more often than dolls and trucks, high school and
college students learning in online environments, and graduates entering a labor market
in which proficiency in digital communication is assumed. Any evolution in the linguistic
means of coordination between agents has broader implications than the simple structure
of this study, extending to online bargaining situations, consumer feedback forums (such
as on Amazon.com), the dating market, international e-Trade, and in the online labor
and admissions markets.
Second, the content in communication also matters – particularly true for messages
with emojis. Although people may vary in their accuracy, the choice to trust appears
to be one of conditional judgment. As illustrated in previous research, subjects draw
some inference about the emotional state of their counterpart. The powerful eﬀect of
emojis also suggests that the more information a person receives about a counterpart, the
more likely it is that stereotypes will be triggered. People might infer something about
a counterpart based on the population from which they are drawn, and employ physical
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cues, such as skin tone and gender, as guides for decisions of trust. These inferences
may be generated by a representativeness heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1975), while
cues about genetic or social relatedness may be encouraging trusting (but not necessarily
trustworthy) behavior (DeBruine, 2002). In this case, knowing a counterpart’s “type” may
enable the decision-maker to calibrate most likely responses, based on prior experience
with similar individuals. Thus, informative markers may be used to guess intent.
While some groups of people may be generally considered “preferable” counterparts
in social games, agents may be choosing emojis signaling their status as good partners.
Regression analysis indicates that there is a significant eﬀect from identity-oriented components of emojis on trust decisions. Markers of dark skin tone and female identity in
messages can have dramatically negative or consistently positive eﬀects, respectively, on
one’s willingness to trust an anonymous agent. The resulting surplus benefits females
representing themselves as such. However, dark skinned persons that use dark emoji are
penalized substantially. I interpret this eﬀect as an attempt on the part of Investors to
benefit from statistical discrimination (Becker, 2010). I conclude that conditional judgments (and stereotypes) are at the core of the trust relationship, and emojis are distinctive
signals that help to drive, or dissuade, cooperative behavior. This paper adds clarity to
the mixed evidence regarding the cooperative behavior of men and women or that found
in other domains.
One of the most striking findings in this study resides in a strong negative association
with trust levels when one receives a dark pigmented emoji, remaining persistent across
both light and dark skinned subjects. Yet, given the existing literature on in group/ out
group particulars of social interaction, this result comes as a bit of a surprise if darker
skinned people are indeed discriminating against people they believe to be dark skinned.
A secondary finding appears to be that dark skinned females may trust dark skinned
people the least. The existence of socioeconomic particulars unique to this subject population may be one possible explanation. The University of Memphis is located in an urban
setting known for historic struggles with poverty and social issues. It is conceivable that
55

such findings would be absent with a subject population in a diﬀerent geographical region
or in a more socioeconomically homogeneous setting. However, the demographic richness
of this study remains an advantage over those in many other studies for precisely this
finding. Following from these observations, there are implications for policy. Firms using
emoji-marketing would be best oﬀ using those markers in emojis that target the demographic group most likely to consume a product. Alternatively, governmental institutions
should consider restricting the type of communication modes available for employment or
academic application to avoid the potential impact of implicit statistical discrimination.
The final broad takeaway is that if Investors do rely on the emoji signals as a basis for
their trust and statistically discriminate, there beliefs are proved wrong. Trust judgements
are often not on target, in that they don’t pay strong returns. In this study, females are
good counterparts to have (such as in Buchan et al., 2008), but no more so than males,
and dark skinned individuals also reciprocate at high levels, meaning that the stereotypes
are not founded in reality. If the average Responder gets a signal that indicates that the
Investor was female, this appears to increase returns. One explanation for this is that
if Responders view their actions from a standpoint of fairness or altruism, they might
be more charitable to females than males. Nevertheless, they fit the trends reported in
the literature. CMC is less influential on reciprocal action, yet trustworthiness remains
uncommonly high. These eﬀects persist in all treatments.
In the real world, people that display trustworthiness may base their actions on a
trade-oﬀ between a socially norm for fairness and individual gain. A high percentage of
my subjects appear to go out of their way to make distributions fair, and it appears that
this behavior was largely driven by preferences for equitable splits.33 The presence of an
implicit social contract could explain this finding, but the psychometric variables do not
support this assertion. I propose that the existence “fairness” preferences better explains
33

It might be that students in this Southern-region have stronger preferences for fairness than in other
areas of the nation. Catherine Eckel has informally referred to this as the ‘Texas Eﬀect’, an observation
that in Texas-based experiments, subjects are more generous or trustworthy, on average, than in other
subject pools.
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this result. My results suggest that in a socially risky context such as the Investment
Game, the sexes and those of diﬀerent skin tone groups are equally reciprocal in social
action – they all make good counterparts. Hence, the use of statistical discrimination
appears impractical, at least when looking at trust within the emoji treatment.
While I document significant eﬀects on type by two types of CMC, there are other
areas for continued research. When individual characteristics or signals are inaccurate
predictors of a counterpart’s behavior, such as in this study, then such judgments may
lead to suboptimal decisions on the part of both agents. The next logical extension would
be adding a treatment in which text and emoji are used in unison. However, the fact that
chat log data cannot be forcibly elicited complicated such an approach. Such a treatment
would need a prohibitively large sample size; although this approach might be possible
utilizing Amazon Mechanical Turk.
Face-to-face oﬀers the possibility of sympathy and other emotional responses that can
be conveyed by vocal intonation, facial expression, and body language – things that emoji
attempt to emulate. Recent papers establish a demand for information in anonymous
exchanges (Eckel & Petrie, 2011) and a willingness to supply (List & Heyes, 2016). In
this study, I establish that there is some value associated with CMC for each player in
trust interactions. Another opportunity for study is designing a laboratory protocol for
elicitation of individual agents’ willingness to pay for the right to send computer mediated
messages (that is, from both the demand and supply side).
An unanswered question in this study is whether agents use emoji strategically. Is
there evidence of deception? Might there exist a pooling equilibrium in which everyone
uses the emoji signals most commonly associated with trust? This study shows that
such information has value in trust decisions, but was not structured to detect strategic
“switching” or mimicry – both strategic decisions. Future studies may focus on the use of
CMC to strategically emulate what is known about an otherwise anonymous counterpart.
When people are uncertain about the trustworthiness of their counterpart, they make
inferences about reliability from all information about the counterpart that is available to
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them. The results in this paper make it evident that CMC is an essential ingredient in the
modern trust decision, while emojis have eﬃcient and intrinsic qualities that might make
them more valuable than simple text. While the informative value of this communication
may be diﬀerent depending on the role of the agent, it certainly drives the amount of
welfare that changes hands as well as the interpretation of why an exchange took place.
It may not be the case that a “picture is worth a thousand words,” but emoji do appear
to be at least as important as simple text in one’s willingness to trust.
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Chapter 1

Gender Perception of Emoji Signals: Content Analysis vs.
Incentivized Coordination Games
Introduction

Content analysis is a research technique used to make replicable and valid inferences by
interpreting and coding textual media. By systematically evaluating texts (e.g., documents, oral communication, and graphics), it typically functions as a conduit between
purely quantitative and purely qualitative research methods, allowing researchers to analyze socio-cognitive and belief generating constructs that are diﬃcult to study via traditional quantitative methods, while increasing potential sample size. Content analysis can
be a valuable research tool on the societal level because it allows investigators to examine the nuances of organizational behaviors, stakeholder perceptions, and societal trends.
Content analysis has only recently has it become more prevalent among economists, yet
there is no generally accepted method to classify certain types of data.
Traditional content analysis (also called “opinion mining”) is problematic in that subjective content is assessed on the individual level by reviewers being compensated with a
flat rate scheme. Due to the subjective nature of many data sources, reliability, eﬃciency,
and validity of the results are compromised. This is because the metrics typically involve
mean estimation from n coders (evaluators) over a set of text or media objects that require a subjective judgement, independent of other coders. This is reality is especially
vexing when reviewing abstract content, such as emoji, which might involve social beliefs
or judgment attached. Emoji pictographs are no longer a millennial trend and are the
fastest growing digital language, yet are not text based, leading to diverse interpretations,
beliefs, and stereotypes about users.
The aim of this paper is to systematically compare the eﬃciency of these two methods,
and determine which method is better for belief-based classification. In both methods,
evaluators face a classification task – a series of emojis – in which they supply their
perception of the gender of an unknown messenger. I use two experimental labor markets
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as a “horse-race” framework to determine the eﬃciency of traditional content analysis
relative to an objective, “social norms” approach for identifying gender “stereotypes.” In
the later, I saliently reward evaluators for giving a response corresponding to the social
norm. I then compare eﬃciency in each method by looking a three criteria: actual number
of classifications (usefulness), diﬀerences in variance in classification (disagreement), and
total duration of 120 tasks (time eﬃciency). I also identify the gender diﬀerences in the
beliefs of agent’s, given receipt of an emoji. Many emoji have imbedded signaling content,
similar that found in natural language, that can indicate gender, cultural background,
socioeconomic origin, or aﬀective state of a sender.1 To my knowledge, this method has
not been used before to classify emoji in any capacity.
Using the design detailed in the following section, I demonstrate that an objective
“target” procedure allows one to infer more from classifications of data than is possible
with an individual, subjective approach by using multiple proximate criteria. My objective
approach classifies more objects by gender than the subjective, while evaluator responses
have less variance on average in the former. The objective approach takes evaluators less
time to execute than traditional content analysis. Females take less time and classify
emoji by gender more often, when compared to males. I conclude that the results of
objective classification (via incentivized coordination) are a more robust determination of
“intent” or “belief” than found in subjective approaches. One possible explanation is that
a norms based approach allows the individual evaluator to use a social heuristic. This is
important because agents often make economic decisions based on a normative paradigm
– a shared belief system where – in the face of ambiguity – a decision is made using the
normative “group” standard or belief.
1

Luor, Wu, Lu, and Tao (2010) demonstrate that the categories of emojis used by these users provide
rich signals for the identification and the understanding of cultural diﬀerences of mobile device users.
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Incentivized Classification Game Model
Content analysis is a subjective measure which attempts to translate qualitative observations in something quantitatively useful. Because it is subjective, there is great variance
and no clear standard. Since community beliefs about an emoji is key to this paper, the
goal is to use an objective, normative method of classification.
In economics, there is no generally accepted method for encoding certain types of
data. A recent trend in experimental economics is to explore a normative approach
to interpreting content. For example, in Houser and Xiao (2011), strategic interaction
between evaluators is employed in the design to incentivize their responses toward a
perceptually focal, social equilibrium, rather than a personal opinion. They argue that
objective classifications can substantially clarify and extend the nature of the conclusions
reached from communicative data, and while they declare their method eﬃcient, they do
not test this assertion as I do. The theoretical structure in this study loosely follows both
Houser and Xiao (2011) and Krupka and Weber (2013), by using a coordination game to
find normative standards.2
The game is defined as follows:

= {I = {1, 2..., N }, S = (Si ⇥ S 1 ), Ui (⇡i (J, Y ))}
There are n > 1 players in set I (Evaluators) that are asked to classify ✏ > 0 emoji into
k > 0 categories or bins. A strategy si is k 0 2 [1, 2, ..., K], where the strategy set for Si
includes all k elements. The goal is to assign each emoji to a single category. Evaluators
are told that after they have all completed this task a set of Jˆ ⇢ J (✏

j > 0) emojis

are chosen at random. Each evaluator earns f = 1, a participation fee, plus $Y > 0
2

XH use a coordination game, hiring evaluators to classify what combination of words constitutes a
“promise” using text data from Charness and Dufwenberg (2006). The framework identifies a community
mindset by independent reviews as a substitute for traditional content analysis found in many linguistic
and psychology papers. KW use the approach to distinguish between normative amounts in simple
giving games, proposing that agents with social preferences gain additional utility from a sub-utility
function attaching weight to socially normative amounts sent.
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for each of the chosen messages such that their own message classification matches the
most popular classification for the chosen emoji – the normative classification. Thus, the
i evaluator is incentivized to target what should be the most likely responses of the other
subjects

i.

There will be multiple strategy profiles s which are Nash equilibria. However, I am
only interested in the focal PSNE ŝ – the one the players actually arrive upon.3 As I
only have a single equilibrium of interest, while many that exist, it is natural to ask how
people actually play this game. While XH conclude that evaluators coordinate on message
content, I expect that the focal equilibrium will be the most likely gender origin. Subjects
will most often coordinate on the normative signaling content of the image. This suggests
classifications that are the most sensible with respect to expected community beliefs.
When dealing with pictures and associated stereotypes, it is precisely this standard that
is relevant when trying to draw an inference regarding the uncertain sender of an emoji.
Consider the case (normal form in Table 11) in which two players classify a single emoji:
n = 2, ✏ = 1, k = 3|Si = {M, N, F }, j = 1. Each evaluator earns a participation fee, f = 1.
Let the payoﬀ for a successful coordination be the incentive pay be ($Y ) = ⇡ > 1 for
that outcome being reached. The resulting coordination game can be expressed in normal
form as a simple 3x3, dominance solvable matrix as in Table 11. There are three Nash
equilibria in pure strategies, each a coordination by gender. However, the realized focal
coordination depends on the existing social norm.
Table 11: Incentivized Coordination Game for Classification

Player 1

3

M
N
F

Player
M
N
⇡, ⇡ 1, 1
1, 1 ⇡, ⇡
1, 1 1, 1

2
F
1, 1
1, 1
⇡, ⇡

It is known that coordination game decisions are related to social or cultural norms. Schelling (1960)
gives shared experience or social history between players as explanations for the focal nature of specific
equilibria. In this study, the focal equilibrium is determined by the socially normative belief of origin
by gender.
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1.1

Experimental Methodology

There are 120 emoji objects to be classified in this study, and I use them to compare two
coding methods. The following methodology is designed to test the following hypotheses,
corresponding to my eﬃciency criteria:
H1 Objective methods should classify at least as many objects as in a subjective method
(classification eﬃciency)
H2 The mean variance in the objective method should lower (less variance)
H3 The mean duration of time in the object method should be lower (time eﬃciency)
I utilized a 1x2 between subjects design, creating two experimental labor markets. In each,
subjects were randomly assigned to one of two treatment conditions. Ad hoc power tests
( > 0.5, power = 0.8, ↵ = 0.05) indicated a target sample size of 200 subjects. I recruited
214 student evaluators from the general student population using SONA scheduling software, executed with assistance from the Customer NeuroInsights Research Laboratory
(CNRL) at The University of Memphis. I verified their consent, understanding of withdraw policy, and then I instituted two comprehension checks to ensure subjects understood
the nature of the task.
Evaluators then completed a gender classification task conducted on Qualtrics), and
worked independently. I informed them that others would be completing the same task,
but told them nothing about the composition of the evaluator group. In a pre-task questionnaire, subjects supplied basic demographics and answered questions about mobile
device habits (such as frequency of emoji use).4 Before completing tasks (but after the
survey), subjects were randomly assigned to one of to treatment groups. In both baseline
and treatment, coders evaluated 120 emoji (k = 120 tasks), including the 100 most commonly used emojis (according to https://www.Emojitracker.com) and 20 lesser known
4

A full account of the study questions is provided in Table 24 and sample instruments for the classification
tasks are shown in Figure 20, both found in the Appendix.
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emoji.5
In the baseline condition (hereafter, the content analysis baseline is referred to as CA),
I requested classification of 120 emoji following the prototypical content analysis/opinion
mining method. Subjects were hired as coders, receiving a flat rate compensation of
virtual currency, good for one “class credit.” Payments were made post-study, by email.
In the CA baseline, evaluators were told:
Imagine you have received an emoji from someone you do not know. For
each of the emoji pictographs, please associate the sender of the image as more
likely to be male, more likely female, or neutral (no overall gender association).
In the main treatment – an incentivized Coordination game (hereafter IC), subjects
classified the same 120 emojis. Student evaluators assigned to the game treatment received
the following instructions:
Imagine you have received an emoji from someone you do not know. For
each of the emoji pictographs, please classify the sender of the image as more
likely to be male, more likely female, or neutral (no overall gender association).
Pick what you think most people in the study would pick.
In addition to the flat rate credits, I incentivized evaluators in IC with the oﬀer of a
$5 Amazon gift card for classifying a number of randomly chosen emoji in the same
way as the majority of the other evaluators, and informed them they would be alerted
via email in the event they had won the card as a payment bonus. 35 gift cards were
paid out by emailed codes. Total completion time was logged for each subject over the
120 classifications (duration of tasks). The protocol was executed according to current
experimental economics standards and with IRB approval #PYO-2017-14. There was no
deception throughout.
5

These 20 were taken from the data in the study described in Chapter 2.
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Results
This section details experimental results designed to test the preceding hypotheses of
IC eﬃciency, compared to the CA baseline. 213 evaluators were randomly distributed
into two balanced treatment groups. Table 12 lists the gender composition of each treatment, and documents the especially balanced sample. This gender balance is particularly
beneficial, in that it gives a clearer picture of how perception might diﬀer for females.
Table 12: Characteristic Breakdown of Sample, by Gender and Treatment
Gender
CA
IC
Female
55
54
Male
51
53
Total
106
107
Note:
213 evaluators were randomly
distributed into two balanced treatment
groups, CA and IC.

Total
104
109
213

Classification Tasks Totals
For each emoji object, the individual evaluator’s coding of an emoji can be male, neutral,
or female origin. Formally, I represent it by a discrete, 3-valued variable, ki , which denotes
the sentiment class:
ki 2 { 1, 0, 1}.
This variable models my assumptions about the ordering of the gender belief values
and the distances between them. For each emoji object, there will then be a discrete
distribution
N (ki ),

X
ki

Nk = N, ki 2 { 1, 0, 1}

capturing the range of the gender classifications. For each emoji distribution, I then
from the discrete probability distribution:

(p , p0 , p+ ),

X

pk = 1

Ki

and the probability of being assigned to a particular gender origin is estimated from
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relative frequencies
p ki =

N (ki )
.
N

Once I have a discrete probability distribution, with properly estimated probabilities,
compute the mean:
Ki =

X
Ki

ki · pki

and I define the classification, µ̄k , as the mean of the discrete probability distribution:

µ̄k =

1p + 0p + 1p+ , where

1 < µ̄k < 1.

The subjectivity (in the case of CA) or objectivity (in the case of IC) can then be defined
as (p , p+ ). When the value of µ̄k for each emoji object is determined, I assign it a binary
indicator “From male” (tending to -1) or “From female” (tending to 1). Table 13 shows
a sample from all emoji tasks that were gender classified by this method. For example,
the emoji “Winking and Blowing Kisses” (Unicode point code 0x1f618) had a µ̄k value of
0.412 (s.e. 0.240) in the CA treatment (n = 108), and so it is given the mean designation
“From female” for the baseline group. The same emoji task was given to the IC group,
and also gender classified as “From female”, with µk value of 0.562 (s.e. 0.141). Also
illustrated in Table 13, the “See No Evil” emoji was not gender classified in CA (µ̄k =
0.271, s.e. 0.129), but was classified as “From female” in the IC group (µ̄k = 0.373, s.e.
0.226). This example shows how the IC method is an improvement over CA.
Table 13: Emoji Task Classifications (sample)
Emoji Task

Name

Unicode

µ̄k Score-CA (se)

Classified CA

µ̄k Score-IC (se)

Classified IC

Face Blowing Kiss

0x1f618

0.412 (0.240)

From Female

0.562 (0.141)

From Female

Pistol

0x1f52b

-0.689 (0.023)

From Male

-0.719 (0.013)

From Male

See No Evil
0x1f648
0.271 (0.129)
Neutral
0.373 (0.226)
From Female
Note: Gender classification given by µ̄k , where 1 < µ̄k < 1. A score tending to 1 and 1 std. dev. from mean
of all scores is given a “From female designation, and one tending to -1 is classified “From male.”

The total number of gender classifications, by treatment, are given in Figure 8. Of
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the 120 individual emojis to be classified by each evaluator, 53 were actually classified as
distinctive by gender in the CA condition, and 58 were in the IC treatment. I interpret
these gender classifications as meaning that evaluators in each have firm beliefs about the
gender origin of a particular emoji. Of the 53 classified in CA, were 35 “From female”
and 18 “From male”, whereas 38 were “From female” and 20 “From male” in IC. This
means a total of 5 more gender classifications were made in the objective condition.
While numerically this doesn’t seem significant, it is important as it suggests that these
determinations would not have been made with traditional content analysis methods.

Figure 8: Frequency of an Emoji Evaluated by Gender
Given that more classifications were made overall without “switching” (changes between treatments), I can reject the null that the objective method yields fewer (and
inconsistent) gender classifications, and direct my inquiry to diﬀerences in variance across
classified objects.
Statistical Eﬃciency Measures
My second measure of eﬃciency is the variance of classifications by individuals for the sum
of the 120 task. I compare the variance of the standard deviation from the individual emoji
classifications. Each emoji task has a distribution Nk . I take the standard deviation for
each distribution and find its mean for both the baseline and the IC treatment condition.
The intuition is that if the mean variance of the IC treatment is smaller than that of CA,
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then the method of measurement is more eﬃcient. This means that if the mean variance is
smaller in a distribution, there is less “disagreement” between evaluators. If that measure
is greater on average in CA, then the group belief in IC is a more robust method than
the subjective assessment.
Figure 9 displays the diﬀerences in mean variance between treatment distributions.
The average standard deviation in CA was 0.493, whereas it decreases in IC to 0.441.
A pairwise t- test, shown in Table 14 indicates a significant diﬀerence between these
distributions (t = 5.44). These results are evidence of greater eﬃciency in the IC method,
and support for H2 .

Figure 9: Diﬀerence in Variance between Treatments
Table 14: Paired t- test, Classification Distribution, by Treatment
Variable
Std. Dev. (CA)
Std. Dev. (IC)
Diﬀ.
Note:
H0 :
Std.Dev.(CA)=0;

Obs.
Mean
S.E.
120
0.493
0.008
120
0.441
0.010
0.508
0.009
mean(Std.Dev.(IC)t =5.41

Duration of Classification Tasks
Eﬃciency can also me measured in terms of task completion time. This is important for
studies in which individual productivity or the costs of running a particular experiment
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are a concern, if related to time. The total amount of time (in seconds) it took each
evaluator in each treatment to evaluate 120 emoji objects was collected (the variable
duration). Because performance is not incentivized, this is not a productivity measure,
rather a simple accounting of the length of task. I argue that when subjects take less time
in one treatment, relative to another, that they expend less cognitive load – and perhaps
exhibit less confusion or disagreement. Thus, duration is justified as a rough-and-tumble
eﬃciency measure.
Figure 10 shows the diﬀerences in task completion time by gender and treatment.
Clearly, the IC task has a shorter duration time on average compare to CA. This diﬀerence
in means is shown to be statistically significant with a Kolmogorov-Smirnov equality of
distributions tests (p = 0.001), supporting H3 .

Figure 10: Task Duration Time, by Treatment
There is reason to believe this variable may vary by gender. In Figure 11, I break the
diﬀerences in task completion time down by gender and treatment. Females are clearly
faster than males in both treatments, with more variance and outliers in male completion
time. Curiously, females in IC are about 200 second faster on average than those in
CA. One hypothesis for this finding is that females might be more community or socially
oriented, thus are more in tune with normative standard (at least when it comes to emoji).
Again using a KS test, I find that the diﬀerence in means for duration between females
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and males across both treatments is significant (p = 0.001) and the diﬀerence between
females in CA and IC is also significant (p = 0.012).

Figure 11: Task Duration Time, by Treatment and Gender
For a deeper understanding of those subject that perform faster, Table 15 shows the
results of a simple linear regression on the determinants of task duration time. Using a
standard OLS model with robust standard errors, I find that being in the IC treatment
results in a 148 second shorter completion time compared to CA (99% los). This appears
largely driven by females, who have a 134 second shorted completion time (99% los). As
an evaluator’s age increases by one year, their duration time increases by 6 seconds (99%
los), and the perhaps most predictable result, as one’s reported experience using emoji
increases, her completion time decreases. Table 16 describes the determinants of emojiuse for my sample. Again, females appear to be driving these main results. This finding
supports anecdotal evidence that females are more frequent users of emojis overall. Given
the above duration results, I reject the null the the two treatment conditions are the same
in terms of duration, and find IC more time eﬃcient.
Conclusion
This draft reports the results of an experimental horse-race to determine the eﬃciency of
traditional content analysis tasks relative to an incentivized, social norms approach. Using
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Table 15: Determinants of Task Duration Time
Variable

Coeﬃcient
(Std. Err.)
-148.891⇤⇤⇤
(25.652)

IC Treatment
Female

-133.871⇤⇤⇤
(28.397)

Age

5.606⇤⇤⇤
(1.753)

Native english

5.703
(36.393)

Emoji experience

-100.754⇤⇤⇤
(15.549)

Text messaging experience

-1.148⇤
(0.614)

Apple device

-51.376
(38.059)

Intercept

745.113⇤⇤⇤
(60.388)

N
213
R2
0.28
F (7,204)
9.528
⇤⇤⇤
=1% los, ⇤⇤ =5% los, ⇤ =10% los
Note: OLS model with robust std. errors. IC treatment indicates subject was in the incentivized treatment. Coeﬃcients are in terms of seconds to complete the 120 classification tasks.

a laboratory labor market, I compared a flat-rate, content analysis scheme with an incentivized coordination game for the classification of emoji messages by gender association
across three eﬃciency criteria. I find that number of gender classifications between the
two treatments are similar, but the average variance in response game treatment greatly
decreased. Mean completion time is also greatly decreased in the objective evaluation
method. There is some diﬀerence in the way females and males execute the classification
tasks, with females faster and more likely to classify an emoji by gender. These results indicate the coordination game yields a more eﬃcient method by which to assign laboratory
classification tasks, identify possible stereotypes, and indicate the informational content
of subjective responses. This limited analysis is suﬃcient to demonstrate the scientific
merit of using an incentivized, objective classification procedures.
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Table 16: Characteristics of Frequent Emoji Use
Variable
Female

Coeﬃcient
(Std. Err.)
18.518⇤⇤⇤
(4.084)

Age

-0.706⇤⇤⇤
(0.265)

Native english speaker

2.626
(5.825)

Intercept

60.685⇤⇤⇤
(8.272)

N
R2
F (3,207)
⇤⇤⇤
=1% los,

⇤⇤

=5% los, ⇤ =10% los

211
0.117
9.977

Note: OLS model with robust standard errors. Ŷ = Percentage of
electronic messages that includes emojis, per day.

The result of gender identification task shows that indeed certain emoji may be commonly believed to identify the gender of the sender. However, this says nothing about
whether message readers are correct in their beliefs. Females in this study appear to be
more socially aware, and thus, a study more focused on gender diﬀerences is a natural
opportunity for future research.
For this study, normative “beliefs” about the origin of a signal are suﬃcient. However,
further research may compare the eﬀects of “correctness” on sequential responses when
evaluators get feedback on their progress. Also, objective measures may be better at identifying other stereotypical group beliefs that may be missed when using traditional opinion
mining. Pollsters often encounter this problem when trying to measure the “opinions” of
voters that do not want to be counted (the immeasurable “silent majority”). Incentivized
coordination may be used to isolate gender or cultural stereotypes of productivity or
trustworthiness where content analysis may fail (often respondents have the tendency to
lie on questionnaires for fear of being judged or outed by researchers). It is also relatively
inexpensive to impose this method to an experimental design. While I argue that the
result of objective classification via incentivized coordination is a more robust definition
of “intent” or “belief” than is possible with subjective approaches, I leave these questions
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for a future study.
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Chapter 2

Shielding Behavior, Social Norms, and Reciprocity in One Shot
Games
Introduction

A multitude of economic decisions involve various levels of uncertainty about the outcome. Experimental research on risk attitudes has traditionally centered on individual
decision-making issues, without much consideration for potential social influence on risk
preferences (e.g., Eckel & Grossman, 1998; Holt & Laury, 2002). However, as real-world
decisions are often viewed in a social context, a decision-maker is hardly ever the only
person aﬀected by the consequences of her actions. Risk perception is not static and often
aﬀects the way people behave. Still, choices in lotteries can vary, depending on the probabilities, the stakes, and importantly, the fact that other agents also face the consequences.
Accordingly, acting on behalf of others is at the frontier of current economic literature,
while choosing actions over a lottery on behalf of a dyad has yet to be explored.
Indeed, many risky decisions do not only aﬀect another, but are specifically taken on
behalf of them, such as in the financial world or in the health domain. In the reality,
economic agents often consider the consequences of their actions, not only for themselves,
but also also for members of a group. Until recently, experimental economic studies have
neglected this consideration, considering all parameters of pro-social actions as individually deterministic.1 Standard models of perfectly rational agents have nothing to say
about altruism. Therefore, shielding warrants deeper inspection.
This paper, details a laboratory experiment exploring socially beneficial choices for
a dyad in a lottery setting. Following a recent body of literature (e.g., Owens, 2014) it
is reasonable to belief that agents valuing “fairness”, or a degree of pro-social behavior,
are more likely to engage in shielding. The research design specifically allows me to
disentangle the roles of altruism, reciprocity, and social norms in a context where an
1

Pro-social behavior can be defined as actions that benefit members of a group or society as a whole
(Cialdini, 2009), and is characterized by helping that does not solely benefit the helper. In fact, pro-social
behavior is often accompanied by costs.
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individual’s decision aﬀects both themselves and another person.
Definition Shielding: a pro-social behavior in which a sacrifice by an agent is an action
determining the probabilistic outcome for oneself and a passive counterpart.
It is also reasonable to postulate that those valuing pro-social behavior are sensitive to
potential, reciprocal actions of a counterpart when participating in shared lotteries. This
creates a strategic dimension to a shielding choice which is missing in the literature. Game
theory revolves around the assumption that individuals act according to self-interest and
make best responses to others that maximize their personal payoﬀs. This study explores
the following research questions:
Will an agent sacrifice to shield a dyad (agent and partner) in a shared lottery? What are
the drivers or circumstances in which they do this (e.g., altruism, risk attitudes, etc.)?
Does prospective reciprocity influence shielding? Is there a social norm of shielding? Interestingly, common in inquiries of “other-regarding” behaviors is that, under the common
assumption of risk-neutral agents, Expected Utility Theory predicts rational agents would
not engage in this behavior.
Contrary to the assumption of pure self-interest, agents do sacrifice in order to avoid
the consequences of a shared lottery. One motivation for such behavior is altruism – a
desire to help others with no expectation of reward – while risk aversion is not a driver.
Females are far more likely to sacrifice to shield a pair in shared lotteries, as well as
more likely to punish a partner that does not shield her. I find a persistent social norm
for protecting a vulnerable counterpart.The results of this study provide evidence that
pro-social behavior can proliferate in unique, risky social environments, in contrast to
theoretical predictions.2 I find that that altruism and social norms play a more important
role in shielding decisions than previously considered in public goods games or “risky”
games.
While there are other domains in which it applies, shielding captures the essentials
2

For a deeper explanation, see Gintis (2003).
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of the consumption decision involved in many preventative health behaviors – one that
includes probability, altruism, and reciprocity. Nearly all vaccine consumption involves
pro-social, shielding behavior. Prior studies link monetary incentives and informational
interventions to only marginal eﬀects on pro-social behavior (Banerjee, Duflo, Glennerster,
& Kothari, 2010). Another compelling element of the shielding decision is the fact in many
cases, individuals face asymmetric consequences for the actions chosen by the decisionmaker in a dyad. Consider the case of HPV, in which females face a disproportional rate
of catastrophic outcome when compared to males. In such a scenario, male uptake of a
vaccine would minimize the risk of a inconvenient outcome, whereas that uptake might
have a tremendous eﬀect of the welfare of a female partner.3
There are a number of reasons to believe that taking shielding into the lab is more
eﬀective than the limited prior studies on dyadic choice, and particularly, vaccination.
Such studies are often diﬃcult and very expensive in field, often generating inconclusive
and overly generalized results. Such interventions directly aﬀect the welfare of participants
in ways that neither observable ex ante nor ex post. Additionally, studies that focus on
behavioral actions, and not self-reported action, are often more believable and suﬀer from
less measurement error. Control measures in the lab contribute to the accuracy of data
and exclude the motivational biases that often accompany other studies (i.e., control in
the lab excludes “homegrown preferences”). Finally, I do not restrict the inquiry to exclude
all talk of risk aversion. However, the focus of this inquiry is on the non-risk components
of dyadic choice. These are eﬃciently extricated in the lab setting I describe in the body
of this manuscript.
The primary contributions of this paper are to fill a gap in the literature by discussing
choice on behalf of a dyad, and exploring the altruistic components missing in other
3

HPV vaccine uptake in this context is not merely pro-social, it is inherently altruistic. This assertion is
echoed in DiClemente, Crosby, Salazar, Nash, and Younge (2011), but not tested. The CDC estimates
that nearly 100% of reported cervical cancer cases are due to one of 4 preventable HPV infections. Male
cancer rates attributable to HPV are around 2%. While transfer of the virus is possible regardless of
sex of partner, the fact remains that women tend to die from HPV far more often than men do (CDC,
2015).
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studies of choice on behalf of others. Additionally, this model explores degrees of altruism,
disentangling this aspect from risk attitudes of the experimental subjects and addressing
the question of asymmetric consequences in lotteries. These measures will exceed current
literature in that we will more rigorously examine the determinants of this pro-social
behavior – that is to say, I sketch a profile of those shielding, and more importantly,
those not shielding. Another contribution of this experiment is to improve on economic
models of vaccination, departing from the “public goods” format common in epidemiology
literature. From these results, policy-makers might develop “nudge” interventions that
incentivize such behavior (e.g., Altmann & Traxler, 2014). Thus, tweaking the perception
of altruism and related social norms might be used to incentivize certain pro-social acts,
such as vaccination.
The remainder of this essay will consist of the follow: in Section 4.2, I describe the
experimental procedure, theoretical underpinnings, and empirical strategy; in Section 4.3,
I include a brief discussion of the results; and in Section 4.5, I summarize the draft and
plot a path for future research.
Experimental Methodology
In this experiment, an individual decision-maker faces a sort of lottery situation similar
to the “risky” Dictator game (e.g. Bohnet & Zeckhauser, 2004; Owens, 2014; Pahlke,
Strasser, & Vieider, 2012; and Krawczyk & Le Lec, 2008). Using risky Dictator Games
and a 2x2 experimental design, I put subjects choice situations where both Dictators’
and Receivers’ payoﬀs are lottery dependent. Subjects are randomly assigned into one of
four treatment groups, each with randomly assigned roles (double blind), described in the
following section. The design flow is detailed in Figure 12.
In the baseline, the outcomes are symmetric for both agents. In one treatment, outcomes are asymmetric, with the decision-maker facing a less catastrophic outcome, while
the recipient bears the full consequence. I then add treatments to show the eﬀect of potential altruistic reciprocity on the decision, giving the recipient the actions of the classic
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Experimental Design
Baseline

Treatment

1 = Player 1
2 = Player 2

Symmetric
“Bad” Outcome

1 : Shielding Game

1 : Shielding Game

2 : None

2 : Dictator
Social Norms Game
Krupka-Weber (2008)

Asymmetric
“Bad” Outcome

1 : Shielding Game

1 : Shielding Game

2 : None

2 : Dictator
Survey

Figure 12: Lab Design Flow
Dictator game and creating a sequential game to capture any strategic considerations –
the Shielding game. The decision-maker chooses whether to accept a lower endowment
(a cost) in exchange for eliminating the risk to the dyad (shielding), or to do nothing and
accept the lottery over both agent’s outcomes. This enables me to systematically study
the eﬀect of one’s propensity for altruism and social responsibility, as well as the eﬀect of
possible diﬀerences by gender.
Assignment to one of the four experimental conditions is followed by a game to elicit
social norms regarding shielding. Once each treatment is complete, all subjects finish
with a debriefing survey.
Theoretical Framework
While it is not the purpose of the experiment to parameterize a theoretical basis for
shielding behavior (in fact, the lab method and theory are analogs), a utility representation
is helpful in describing what is happening in the shielding decision. I assume other-

78

regarding preferences are the driver in pro-social behavior.4 Agents have utility function:

Ui (↵, , Ni (ai )) = {µi [(1

✓i )↵ + ✓i ] +

i Ni (ai )}

(2.0.1)

The sub-utility function µ gives utility over allocations, where an altruism parameter
✓i 2 (0, 1) weighs the agent’s feelings about the allocation for each member of the dyad.
A social adherence parameter

2 R weighs adherence to a social norm function Ni (·). I

assume Ni (·) is monotonic and concave
@Ni
@ 2 Ni
> 0, 2 < 0
@ai
@ ai
and that Ni (·) gives utility over an action ai : ! R, ai 2 Si
In the experiment, I ensure ex ante equality in the initial endowments, but there
will be diﬀerent allocations ex post. I control for fairness preferences in considering the
utility function, concerning the allocation of resources and ex ante and ex post fairness
considerations (as detailed in Fudenberg & Levine, 2012).
The Shielding game
The primary means by which I conduct the inquiry into shielding behavior is to model
the dyadic choice structure in a type of game. The baseline treatment (control) for
the experiment takes the form of a probabilistic, “risky” binary Dictator “game.” This
most closely resembles the “risky” dictator game (RD) found in Bohnet and Zeckhauser
(2004), and more recently Owens (2014).5 An RD is any permutation of the generalized
Dictator format that includes an element of risk or probability. The agent has the choice to
4

Using an extension of µi to incorporate well-known inequality aversion models would be relatively easy
(e.g., Bolton & Ockenfels, 2000; Fehr & Schmidt, 1999; and Levine, 1998).

5

This structure is employed in one form or another in Bohnet and Zeckhauser (2004), Pahlke et al.
(2012), Krawczyk and Le Lec (2008). This is not a proper game, as there is no real strategic interaction
since one player is passive. The stylized RD game in my design continues in the experimental spirit of
Eckel and Grossman (1998) by looking at decision-making and altruism toward an anonymous recipient.
Owens (2014) finds Dictators much more willing to sacrifice their own cash, than to decrease their own
chances of wining a lottery, much to the benefit of Receivers.
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allocate from an initial endowed state; often, this includes a choice between a deterministic
allocation or a lottery for self or other. These results can be explained, albeit only partially,
by Dictators who are risk-averse over their own wealth, but not over Receivers’ wealth.
Baseline Shielding Treatment
The Shielding Game is a representation of the interactions common in the public health
sector where one person is responsible for the care of themselves, and perhaps someone
in need, such as a spouse or sexual partner, a dependent child, a disabled person, or an
elderly individual. The decision one makes on behalf of self and other follows the structure
of a shared lottery, where one agent has the choice between two actions, and the other
passive recipient also has an outcome dependent on that action (shown in Figure 13). The
model that follows is designed to test the following hypothesis:

H1 : Some agents are willing to “pay” in order to shield a dyad
Each subject is given an endowment ei before play, ↵ and , respectively, such that
ei = {↵,

2 R+ ; ↵ = }. Subjects are assigned one of two roles at random: Player 1 and

Player 2. Player 1 has the choice between two actions in a lottery:
• N (do nothing), in which case each player’s endowment is payed out with probability
(1

p), but might suﬀer a catastrophic loss (i.e. go to 0) with some exogenous

probability p 2 (0, 1]. So, Player 1 gets EV (↵), Player 2 gets EV ( ). Thus, the
consequences of that action are felt symmetrically by the dyad.
• S (shield ), in which case Player 1 accepts a lower endowment ↵
ˆ , where ↵
ˆ = ↵ c, c 2
(0, ↵] in order to ensure p = 0, while Player 2 gets . This eliminates the threat of
loss of the endowments to the dyad.
In choosing to do nothing, Player 1 lets Nature N play. p remains exogenous throughout this game and is assumed to be common knowledge. I am primarily interested in
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cases where p is small, otherwise there is not an interesting decision to be made. So, with
p̄ | p̄ 2 (0, 0.5], I will have some
(1

p)↵ + p(0) = EV (↵) = (1

p)

n

+ p(0) = EV (

n)

However, in choosing to shield, Player 1 essentially pays a cost to make the likelihood
of the catastrophic event disappear. This leads to
EV (↵) > ↵
ˆ,
where Player 1 gets a higher expected payoﬀ for doing nothing rather that shielding.
Player 1 also knows that when he shields, Player 2 gets a relatively higher payoﬀ than he
would, with
s

>↵
ˆ

and that shielding gives Player 2 a better outcome

s

> EV (

n)

Player 1 acts as a Dictator over risky endowments. Assuming risk neutrality, expected
utility theory predicts that a self interested Player 1 would choose N in this lottery to
maximize his payoﬀ, independent of Player 2. Importantly, risk aversion has not been
shown to be a significant driver in small stakes experiments. Therefore, if shielding is
observed, value for pro-social behavior is a likely motivation.6 A key prediction in this
study that this will not be the mean experimental outcome, which would imply some
degree of other-regarding preferences.
An argument could be made that the decision to shield depends on prior history or
relationships between the agents. I do not consider this an issue. The standard procedure
6

For a more detailed explanation, see List (2011) and Rabin (2000).
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Extensive form, Shielding Game
Symmetric consequence (baseline)

1

N

(0, 0)

p

N
1

↵,

↵
ˆ=↵

c, c 2 (0, ↵]

We want p 2 (0, 1]|EV (N ) > EV (S)
p

(↵, )
Assuming risk neutrality, EUT predicts
1 chooses N

(ˆ
↵, )

S

2 R+

Figure 13: Shielding Game, symmetric “bad”
in experimental economics maintains anonymity among laboratory participants (as in this
study). However, many field interactions are conducted with neither complete anonymity
nor complete familiarity. While intuition would lead one to believe that agents would
behave diﬀerently in Dictator games if they know the recipient, the overwhelming evidence
in experimental literature is to the contrary.7 Therefore, the shielding game should apply
to most dyad, regardless of social distance between agents.
Asymmetric Shielding Treatment
In order to disentangle the motive of altruism and risk aversion, I add a treatment to
include an asymmetric outcome in the game. This emulates the real world conditions
under which one agent in a dyad endures diﬀerent consequences from the other. In this
case, if I observe shielding behavior, it is even more likely the choice is driven by altruism.
Thus, I test the hypothesis

H2 : Altruism is a significant driver of an agent’s willingness to shield a dyad

Possible alternatives to H2 might be adherence to a social norm (i.e. one might do
something out of belief they are supposed not, rather than being altruistic), existence of
7

Multiple studies, such as Charness and Gneezy (2008), find that having the family name of another
subject had a slight positive eﬀect on the oﬀers in Dictator and no eﬀect in Ultimatum games, as it
appears that strategic considerations crowd out generosity or charity. This is supported in Engel (2011),
a meta-study of 89 published Dictator experiments that finds that increasing social distance actually
has a negative eﬀect on altruism.
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(extreme) risk aversion, or a cognitive disconnect to the decision problem. To minimize
the eﬀects of risk and tease out altruism, I vary the symmetry of the consequences in
the decision problem. In this treatment, the decision one makes on behalf of the dyad
follows the structure of an asymmetric lottery, in which one agent still has the choice
between two actions, and the other passive recipient also has an outcome dependent on
that action (illustrated in Figure 14).8 Each subject is given an endowment as before, ↵
and , respectively, such that ei = {↵,

2 R+ ; ↵ = }. Subjects will be assigned one of

two roles at random: Player 1 and Player 2. Player 1 has the choice between two actions
in a lottery:
• N (do nothing), in which case each player’s endowment will be payed out with
probability (1

p), but in this case, only Player 2 suﬀers the catastrophic loss (i.e.

! 0) with some exogenous probability p 2 (0, 1], while Player 1 gets a minor
reduction in payoﬀ with p, ↵
˜ where ↵
˜ = ⇢↵, ⇢ 2 (0, 1).
Player 1 gets EV (↵), Player 2 gets EV ( ). Thus, the consequences of that action
are felt asymmetrically by the dyad, with the brunt of the bad outcome felt by
Player 2.
• S (shield), in which case Player 1 accepts a lower endowment ↵
ˆ , where ↵
ˆ = ↵ c, c 2
(0, ↵] in order to ensure p = 0, while Player 2 gets . This eliminates the threat of
loss of the endowments to the dyad as before.
In choosing to do nothing, Player 1 lets nature play. We are primarily interested in cases
where p is small, otherwise there is not an interesting decision to be made. So, with some
p̄ | p̄ 2 (0, .5], we will have some
(1
8

p)↵ + p(⇢↵) = EV (˜
↵) > (1

p)

n

+ p(0) = EV (

n)

This could also be done out of varying c. However, this is less realistic in that in many situations,
the cost of acting pro-social is not great in a monetary sense. The costs here can be considered the
opportunity cost of the choice, such as missing work, psychological costs, and costs to reputation.
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However, in choosing to shield, Player 1 essentially pays a cost to make the likelihood
of the catastrophic event disappear. This leads to
EV (˜
↵) > ↵
ˆ
where Player 1 again gets a higher expected payoﬀ for doing nothing rather that shielding.
Player 1 also knows that when she shields, Player 2 gets a relatively higher payoﬀ than
she would, with
s

>↵
ˆ

and that shielding gives Player 2 a better outcome

s

> EV (

n)

Even more so than in the symmetric (assuming risk neutrality), expected utility theory
would predict that a self-interested Player 1 would choose N in this lottery to maximize
his payoﬀ, independent of Player 2.9 For these experimental treatments, I exogenously set
= 10.Again, risk aversion is rendered nearly insignificant.

p = .2, ↵ = 10, ↵
ˆ = 5, ↵
˜ = 4,

Extensive form, Shielding Game
Asymmetric consequence
↵,

1

N

(˜
↵, 0)

p

N
1

2 R+ ↵
˜ = ⇢↵, ⇢ 2 (0, 1)

↵
ˆ=↵

c, c 2 (0, ↵]

We want p 2 (0, 1]|EV (N ) > EV (S)
p

(↵, )
Assuming risk neutrality, EUT predicts

S

1 chooses N

(ˆ
↵, )

Figure 14: Shielding Game, asymmetric “bad”
9

This case is the analog to the aforementioned vaccination choice, where a male agent’s choice to get the
HPV shot might have relatively light or inconvenient consequences for himself, but drastically diﬀerent
results for a (prospective) female partner.
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Prospective Reciprocity Treatment
I argue that the motivating mindset of deciding to shield the dyad is, in part, based
on altruistic intentions. Another potential driver of shielding is the eﬀect of prospective
reciprocity.10 It is reasonable to expect that the potential for positive reciprocal action
– a reward for pro-social action – should influence the thinking of the first player. That
is, if Player 1 knows that Player 2 might share the resulting endowment post-shielding
(positive reciprocity), it should encourage the choice to shield in the first place. While
this is intuitive behavior, it also conflicts with the Nash equilibrium. Player 1 also knows
that she could be punished if she does not shield and the bad outcome is not realized
(negative reciprocity in the form of a zero return from the second player).
Including this treatment tests

H3 : Prospective reciprocity aﬀects shielding in all treatments

In the Reciprocity treatment, I extend the shielding decision into a true sequential
game of perfect information. The normal form representation of this game is
8
>
< I = { 1 , 2 , N }, E = {e1 = ↵, e2 = |↵, 2 R+ }
= s
>
: S1 = {S, N }, S2 = {x|x 2 [0, ]}, = {p}, ⇡i = Ui

The extensive forms of the games used in these treatments are illustrated in Figures 15
and 16. Where ei and p are as before, the first decision node of the game for the first
player is identical to the shielding decision. Now, the second player has actions, which
correspond to playing a Dictator game over her resulting endowment. The second player
observes the actions of the first player and adjusts her decisions accordingly – her attitude
may also change depending on how Player 1 behaves towards her.
10

Previous experiments have shown that prospective reciprocity can be used a motivation in social arenas
(Cialdini, 1988, 2009), and as treatments in extensive form games (e.g., Berg et al., 1995, Charness &
Rabin, 2005).
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Extensive form, Shielding Game
↵,

Symmetric consequence w/treatment

1

N

2
1

x 2 [0, ]

p

We want p 2 (0, 1]|EV (N ) > EV (S)
(↵ + x,

x)
Assuming risk neutrality, EUT predicts

x 2 [0, ]
(ˆ
↵ + x,

S

c, c 2 (0, ↵]

↵
ˆ=↵

(0, 0)

p

N

2 R+

SPNE = {(N, x = 0)}

x)

Figure 15: Shielding Game, symmetric “bad” w/treatment
Extensive form, Shielding Game
Asymmetric “Bad” Outcome w/ treatment

1

N

2
1

x 2 [0, ]

p

↵
˜ = ⇢↵, ⇢ 2 (0, 1)

c, c 2 (0, ↵]

We want p 2 (0, 1]|EV (↵) > EV (ˆ
↵)
(↵ + x,

x)

) EV ( ) > (ˆ
↵)

Under assumption of risk neutrality:

x 2 [0, ]
S

2 R+

↵
ˆ=↵

(˜
↵, 0)

p

N

↵,

(ˆ
↵ + x,

x)

SPNE = {(N, x = 0)}

Figure 16: Shielding Game, asymmetric “bad” w/treatment
This game is solvable by backward induction. Regardless of the first player’s action,
Player 2 maximizes utility over payoﬀs and allocates no part of a surviving endowment
(x = 0) from the first stage. Knowing this, Player 1 best responds by never shielding.
Assuming risk neutrality and standard rational agents, under a wide range of c and p,
we would expect the Sub-game Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE) to be a strategy profile
s⇤ = (N, x = 0).
Changing the symmetry of the consequences does not aﬀect the predicted SPNE. However, experimental literature suggests subjects in this game would shield more readily in
the case of reciprocity. Thus, I should see some Player 2s share their resulting endowments – both deviations from game theoretical predictions. I predict that any endowment
that results from shielding in the first stage would be especially likely to be shared by a
“thankful” Player 2. In contrast, any surviving endowment that results from the “good”
outcome from Nature where Player 1 has not shielded is much less likely to be shared –
perhaps out of spite from deviation from some social norm.11
11

Dictator games of all types to be particularly sensitive to a multitude of factors (see Eckel & Grossman,
1998 and Engel, 2011). I acknowledge that there is some risk of the follow-up survey responses being
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Eliciting Social Norms
Social proof and normative social adherence are types of social conformity. that might be
drivers of shielding. The term social norms refers to unwritten rules that govern social
behavior. If a decision-maker is unsure of the “proper” way to behave, she will tend to
others for cues concerning correctness, or react to an expectation, given a cache guides
to her action. The agent conforms because she believes that others’ interpretation of an
ambiguous situation is more accurate than hers – a sort of heuristic. Observable and
enduring changes in individuals’ motivations, such as a propensity to behave pro-socially,
may also be based on shared beliefs how individual group members should behave in a
specific situation. These behavioral guidelines are enforced by threat of internal and/or
external sanctions, such as shame or punishment, and internalized through social learning
and socialization. My hypothesis is that a shielding agent might be influenced by the
perception of a normative response.

H4 : There exists a social norm of shielding, as well as adherence,

I will test this hypothesis by adapting a method similar to that in Krupka and Weber
(2009), in which a coordination game is employed to elicit social norms. Importantly,
the authors find that even thinking about – let alone, observing – the behavior of others
produces increased pro-social behavior. This is true even when one actually expects or
observes little pro-social behavior on the part of others.
This experiment controls for strategic influences and likewise demonstrates the direct eﬀect of norms on behavior. In this method, subjects are incentivized to guess the
percentage of subjects in their group that choose to engage in shielding. By taking the
average of the average responses for expected behavior of others in the groups and paying
a bonus for a subject being correct in their beliefs, this method shows that the degree of
aﬀected by treatment assignment in the game, but there is always a trade oﬀ. Giving the survey first
would bias the experimental results.
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pro-social behavior is increasing in the actual and expected pro-social behavior of others.
If a norm is a driver, I will observe a positive correlation between the expected percentage of shielders in the group increasing, with the increased likelihood of an individual
shielding.12
Setting and Procedure
Ad hoc power tests ( > .5, power = 0.8, ↵ = 0.05) indicated a target sample size of
340 subjects distributed into 4 treatments; a final total of 412 subjects were recruited
from the general student population at Fogelman College of Business and Economics at
the University of Memphis using SONA scheduling software. Subjects were oﬀered a 1
academic credit “show up fee,” plus were told they have the opportunity for more, playing
for experimental currency “points” redeemable for course credit.13 Respondents were given
ID numbers after signing consent forms, and randomly assigned to a balanced treatment
group. Random assignment to roles occur within treatments to avoid selection bias.
The Qualtrics flow of the study employs random assignment to roles, but uses the
“strategy” method (Selten, 1967) to elicit responses for all of the subjects as if they were
first movers.14 The advantage of this method is to ensure I do not lose explanatory
power from those ultimately assigned as Player 2s. Randomization devices built into
the Qualtrics flow determined if payoﬀs do not “survive” the first stage of game (control
and treatment), corresponding to Nature deciding the fate of the non-shielded. Timing
12

These benchmarks for behavior that are widely shared by members of a societal group, and often
result in an agent exhibiting public compliance (exclusive to private acceptance) of a group’s social
norm– ultimately to be accepted by the group. Aronson, Wilson, and Akert (2004), Cialdini and Garde
(1987), and Cialdini and Trost (1998) associate social norms, conformity, and the resulting compliance
with a fundamental theme: behaviors they comprise are goal-directed. Such goals include behaving
eﬀectively, building and maintaining relationships. In experimental economics, this has been recently
demonstrated in Gneezy, Leibbrandt, and List (2014).

13

Currency points expire at the end of the study. This is typically done to minimize endowment eﬀect.

14

Roth (1995, p.144) discusses the potentially relevant issues: “Having to submit entire strategies forces
subjects to think about each information set in a diﬀerent way than if they could primarily concentrate
on those information sets that arise in the course of the game.” These concerns are echoed by Harrison
(2006), arguing subjects simply can’t reason strategically. However, Brandts and Charness (2011)
confirm that there should be no treatment eﬀect found with the strategy method that is not observed
with the direct-response method alternative.
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matters in this set up, in that all Player 2s know if they are shielded, which will influence
their behavior in treatments and in the social norms game, so it is crucial that they do
not know the outcome until end of experiment. Payment occurred through SONA after
completion of the study.15
A concern with most studies, particularly lab experiments, the generalizability of
results may be aﬀected by the specific population and setting studied. Studying college
students oﬀers several oﬀsetting advantages. The population is attractive due to the
ability to obtain data in a somewhat controlled environment and to have a larger sample
size. College students still provide a particularly good pool from which to study the eﬀect
of social preferences.
Debriefing Survey
The final stage of the experimental protocol consists of an exit survey, just before payout
of winnings. This is consistent with most of the literature, and is essential to my testing of
H2 . This allows for a thorough investigation into the determinants of shielding behavior
observed in the treatment groups: Who are these people that shield, and, perhaps more
importantly, who are these people that do not? In this manner, I will test

H5 : Existence of statistically significant determinants of shielding behavior (e.g., altruism, gender)

The survey is conducted through Qualtrics and includes scaled questions to elicit
preferences over altruism, risk attitudes over multiple domains, an EV comprehension
measure, as well as standard demographic/SES questions (such as age, gender, marital
status, education, major, etc.). I include questions about childcare/care-giving experience
to see if people shield in real life. Also, I include three probability/likelihood competency
questions; if subjects fail these measures, I censor their data.
15

This study has IRB approval #3946 via the University of Memphis.
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To test H2 and to control for overall altruistic behavior (isolating treatment eﬀects),
I include survey questions that elicit attitudes toward altruism and risk tolerance. These
are questions common in the literature (some from the US General Social Survey), as well
questions on organ or blood donation and volunteering.16 The responses are synthesized
into an “altruism scale” (a primary independent variable of interest), a weighted average
of the responses. To assess self-reported willingness to take risks in diﬀerent domains of
life, subjects complete a risk taking questionnaire taken from the German Socio-Economic
Panel (SOEP). Specifically, subject answer questions regarding their general risk attitudes
(“Generally speaking, are you a person who is ready to take risks or are you trying to
avoid risks?”) as well as questions about risk taking in specific domains, such as health,
professional career, and confidence in strangers. Responses are synthesized into an “risk
tolerance scale” (another independent variable of interest), a weighted average of the
responses.17 The experiment is designed to not frame the choice into either the health or
monetary domains, to avoid dealing with the availability heuristic as a confound (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974).
Empirical Strategy
My primary dependent variable, P r(Yi = 1|treatment) comes from the observation of
shielding in the baseline and treatments. The model regresses shielding on the treatment,
altruism and risk attitudes variables, social norms variables, and a vector of explanatory
covariates. Given the number of dummies, I will am primarily interested in the signs on
the coeﬃcients. To determine the eﬀect of covariates on likelihood of shielding behavior,
16

A full list of debrief questions is given in Table 29. Many of these questions are taken from Banuri,
De Oliveira, and Eckel (2014), which add dimensions of social distance in assessments of altruistic
mindset.

17

Risk attitude does not appear to be a global trait – people express diﬀerent thresholds for financial
risks, health and safety risks, recreational risks, ethical risks, and social risks such as angering colleagues
or friends. Weber, Blais, and Betz (2002) find that experimental subjects’ judgments of domain-specific
risks are best explained by a hybrid model.
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I employ logistical regression (estimated at means) in the form
P r(Yi = 1|shield) = + X01i + X02i + X03i ⌘ +
| {z }
| {z } | {z }
treatment

Where

norms

attitudes

X04i ✓
| {z }

characteristics

captures the marginal treatment eﬀects in the vector of treatments, compared

to the baseline game, gamma reflects the marginal eﬀect of the expected group norm
(by percent of group choosing to shield), ⌘ captures the eﬀects of a vector of attitude
controls (altruism and risk tolerance scale), and ✓ is the marginal eﬀects from a vector of
demographic determinants.
Results
My primary research task was identifying whether diﬀerent treatment conditions – if any
– were significant indicators of an agent’s decision to shield a dyad in the experiment.
Table 17 lists the marginal eﬀects for the treatments and individual level determinants on
the probability of a subject choosing to shield, using a conditional logit model estimated
at means. Since the strategy method was used, this represents the actions of each of the
402 subjects. When agents observe that their counterpart suﬀers more than they, they
chose to shield 10% more on average (99%) The treatment condition indicator for basic
reciprocity treatment is not significant, while the indicator for reciprocity with asymmetric
consequences is, suggesting those in this group are about 11% more likely to shield that
those in the baseline (95%). This result appears to be driven primarily by the asymmetry
in outcomes.
Across all treatments, males shield 21% less on average compared to females, significant
at the 99% level.18 The males also appear to respond more to the case of asymmetric
consequences. A subject’s altruism score is a significant determinant of shielding – as one
is more altruistic in real life, they are more likely to shield in the game (99%). This helps
18

A table listing the summary of statistics from the entire sample is given in Table 27, found in the
Appendix.
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support H2 and emphasizes the main argument that risk aversion is not a key driver of
this type of pro-social choice.
Table 17: Probability of Shielding, Treatment Eﬀects, Full Sample
Variable
Reciprocity

Coeﬃcient
(Std. Err.)
-0.037
(0.057)

Asymmetric outcomes

0.093⇤⇤⇤
(0.039)

Reciprocity*asymmetric outcomes

0.107⇤⇤
(0.046)

Altruism

0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.001)

Risk tolerance

-0.007
(0.006)

Male

-0.210⇤⇤⇤
(0.042)

Social norm beliefs

0.006⇤⇤⇤
(0.001)

N
Log-likelihood

402
-182.033
69.757

2
(8)
⇤⇤⇤ =1%

los, ⇤⇤ =5% los, ⇤ =10% los
Note: Logit model, P r(Shielding Choice = 1) estimated at means. Treatment and
gender variables are binary dummies taking the value of 1 if true. Social norms belief is
continuous, and represents the percentage of subjects the individual believes shielded.
Mean belief of 402 subjects was that 35.23 percent would shield; 21.60 actually did.

The variable for social norms belief is continuous, and represents the percentage of
subjects the individual believes shielded. The mean for this measure across 402 subjects
was that 35.23 percent – the belief that over one third of the group would shield; in fact,
21.60 percent actually did. The belief in a normative behavior is an important motivator
in the literature, and seems to be in this study. The coeﬃcient on the social norm variable,
significant at the 99% level, always me to reject the null that expectations of a normative
behavior have no eﬀect on probability of shielding, and support H4 .
A key hypothesis was that strategic interaction might be a factor in the decision
to shield a dyad. The marginal treatment eﬀects in the previous table do not support
that hypothesis. However, it is useful to look at the amount of currency returned by by
second-movers in the Shielding game. Figure 17 shows a kernel density breakdown of
the amounts returned in the reciprocity treatments. These data are pooled between the
symmetric and asymmetric consequence cases. Amounts between $0 and $6 are uniformly
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distributed when an agent has been shielded by a counterpart. I interpret this as positive
reciprocity – positive amounts sent in compensation, as a reward for pro-social behavior.
In contrast, when agents are not protected by their counterpart, their inclination is to
send far lower amounts – if anything. The peak of the density plot is at $2 returned, with
$0 common, and very few positive amounts over $2 returned. This result is intuitive, in
that if a first-mover is not acting in a social fashion, the second-mover would be more
likely to impose a penalty - negative reciprocity. This result is surprising, however, in
that, in absence of shielding positive amounts are sent at all. Given these results, I must
reject H4 , although the behavior of second movers is consistent with my expectations.

Figure 17: Amount Returned by Treatment

Gender Eﬀects
Experiments generally report that demographic characteristics, including gender, can significantly diﬀerentiate between “types”, such as altruistic or risk averse types.19 In this
study, I am particularly interested in isolating the diﬀerent eﬀects of gender on shielding.
A graphical breakdown of the percentage of shielding agents, by gender, is given in
19

In most reported Dictator-type experiments, women tend to be less selfish than men, while in risk
elicitation studies, women tend to be risk averse (e.g. Eckel & Grossman, 1998, 2001). However,
when recruiting subjects from U.S. universities, Cox and Deck (2006) find that women’s behavior is
more sensitive to the costs of generosity than men’s on average. That result is consistent with a more
developed “social intelligence” in women.
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Figure 18. There are more females in the study overall, and slightly more females in each
treatment. This imbalance should not skew my results.
Table 18: Gender Frequency by Treatment

Treatment
Baseline
Asymmetric
Reciprocity
Asymmetric*reciprocity
Total

Female
57.0
55.0
59.0
63.0
234.0

Gender
Male
48.0
42.0
48.0
40.0
178.0

Total
105.0
97.0
107.0
103.0
412.0

Figure 18: Percentage of shielding agents, by gender
Gender appears to be highly relevant to the propensity to engage in shielding in both
asymmetric and reciprocal treatments. Across all treatments, males shield 21% less on
average compared to females, significant at the 99% level. As it appears that being female
is a significant determinant of shielding, this observation supports H5 .
Figure 19 separates reciprocity behavior by gender. The kernel density plot shows a
remarkably similar pattern when compared males and females returning money to a first
mover, if shielded, with the mean being $3 and the distribution uniform in [0, 6]. This is
in stark contrast to the case in which an agent is not shielded. Females overwhelmingly
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exhibit negative reciprocity – far more readily than men – typically giving $2 or less back
to a non-protective first-mover. Males, on the other hand, send currency more often, even
if the pro-social act is not executed. One interpretation of this result if that females are
more “spiteful” than males. However, another is that this is an artifact of the instructions
not being fully clear, or that experimental currency was used instead of dollar bills.

Figure 19: Amounts Returned, by Gender

Eﬀect of Health Domain Behaviors
One real-world application of this model is in the health behaviors domain. Certain
socially-oriented health behaviors could be linked to the decision to sacrifice in a shared
lottery. This is interesting because if such behaviors are predictors of shielding, they
might identify types of people that might be more susceptible to policy “nudges” in other
domains.
In order to assess the likelihood of shielding conditional on reported pro-social health
behaviors, I run a logistical regression on blood donation, whether one is a registered
organ donor, and vaccination habits (binary variables taking the value of 1 if true). These
behaviors are generally accepted as socially beneficial or as creating positive externalities.
Risk attitudes are disentangled from the aggregate measure used before, as risk-taking
behavior varies across content domains. The risk tolerance variables are scales, givens
subjects attitudes about risky health behaviors for themselves and for others. The same
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altruism measure is used from before as a control. This model takes the form
P r(Yi = 1|shield) = + X01i + X02i + X03i ⌘
| {z } | {z } | {z }
behavior

gender

attitude

In Table 17, I report the probability of shielding a dyad, given reported altruistic
behaviors of individuals in the health domain, estimated at means. Subjects that report
being organ and blood donors are more likely on average to shield (12.2% and 15.4%,
respectively). Receiving an annual flu shot, another pro-social behaviors, suggests an
individual will shield 10% more often than some one that does not. It appears that
being an individual that engages in health oriented pro-social behavior is a significant
determinant of shielding; this observation supports H5 .
Table 19: Probability of Shielding Conditional on Health Domain
Variable
Male

Coeﬃcient
(Std. Err.)
-0.210⇤⇤
(0.042)

Altruism

0.011
(0.008)

Risk Tolerance - my health

-0.002
(0.007)

Risk Tolerance - another’s health

0.004
(0.007)

Organ donor

0.122⇤⇤
(0.044)

Blood donor

0.154⇤⇤
(0.043)

Flu shot

0.101⇤⇤
(0.040)

HPV shot

0.053
(0.027)

N
Log-likelihood

410
-199.233
45.425

2
(5)
⇤⇤ =1%

los, ⇤ =5% los, † =10% los
Note: Logit model, P r(Shielding Choice = 1) estimated at means across
all treatments. Gender, organ donation, blood donation, HPV and flu
vaccination are binary variables taking the value of 1 if true. Altruism,
risk tolerance for own and other’s health are continuous over a scale 0-100.

While the coeﬃcient on HPV vaccine uptake is not significant, it is positive, suggesting
that there might be a correlation between uptake and shielding if I were able to control
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for the likelihood of a subject’s parents making the choice for them.20 Also, there is
little variance in age across subjects, and it is possible that adults (making the choice to
get the HPV vaccine according to CDC guidelines) would be more likely to shield. These
conditions are unobservable to the researcher, and are an opportunity for further research.
Conclusion
In this essay, I wanted to know the eﬀect of altruism, norms, and reciprocity in shielding
decisions – a pro-social behavior in which one agent commits to a costly action which minimizes potential loss in a shared lottery. I modeled shielding behavior, using a “risky” Dictator game in an experimental setting. Exploiting randomized treatments, a stage game
for elicitation of social norms, and logistic regressions over altruism and risk attitudes,
I explore the eﬀects of prospective altruistic reciprocity and asymmetric consequences.
This experiment explains under what conditions agents will sacrifice to shield a dyad –
themselves and a passive other.
The results of this experiment show that the decision to shield is both dependent on
the propensity of an individual to be altruistic in their everyday lives, as well as to the
perception that there is a socially appropriate manner in which to act. Meanwhile, risk
aversion does not appear to be a significant driver of the choice of sacrifice to ensure
benefit to a dyad. While males shield less on average, both sexes respond to a case of
asymmetric consequences, suggesting all subjects have an aversion to extreme inequality
or disproportionate levels of risk.
Previous literature suggests some success in using monetary incentives to encourage
pro-social behaviors such as shielding, yet this study provides evidence that direct intervention promoting altruism and prospective reciprocity may play a stronger role. This
novel model of social behavior may be used to revisit the “vaccination game” – providing
insight into the eﬀect of diﬀerent policies on vaccination uptake – as well as altruism
20

College students are also themselves a highly policy-relevant population for studying HPV shots, as
they are almost certainly the recommended target age, often sexually active, and are poised to enter the
workforce.
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literatures. The potential policy implications are the most compelling outcome of this
study, suggesting a behavioral nudge might be employed to increase uptake of preventative health behaviors, such as the HPV vaccine.21 The fact that males appear to respond
more to the case of asymmetric consequences means they might be targets for such a
nudge. Yet, shielding behavior likely applied to other domains, such as family nutrition,
caring for the elderly, community policing, and something as esoteric as lying to keep a
secret.
Another explanation for any patterns in shielding might could be found in loss aversion.
Some cautious shift types may be willing to shield in order to sacrifice potential earnings
for oneself in order to reduce potential losses for the passive agent. Using a battery of
lotteries and similar decisions for oneself and a third party, Pahlke et al. (2012) provide
evidence for a risky shift in the loss domain and a cautious shift in the gain domain
for moderate probabilities; and a reversal for small probabilities, implying loss aversion.
Alternatively, reduced loss aversion resulting from higher social distance might explain
decisions to not shield.22
One area for continued research is to explore treatments out of the baseline game, such
as allowing pre-action chat between counterparts. Another is to look at reputation eﬀects
by making the game repeated and removing the anonymity of the subjects within groups.
A repeated game version would be more eﬀective in studying flu shots, for example. One
possible approach might be to explore the possibility of multiple behavioral subgroups that
may be further explained by the estimation of distinctive coeﬃcients across subgroups.
This would be done by applying a Bayesian finite mixture model. Due to the novelty of
this game, I do not know how many subgroups could exist, or what characteristics might
drive the diﬀerences across subgroups. The approach would then be to analyze the results
21

22

There appear to be no studies in the literature using social/digital media in experiments to elicit
social preferences. The student population seems a prime target for such a study. Also, as discussed in
Bronchetti, Huﬀman, and Magenheim (2015), many experimental designs address some of the problems
with establishing causality of peer eﬀects. These issues could potentially be overcome with the use of
digital media, such as Twitter.
See Andersson, Holm, Tyran, and Wengström (2014).
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without predefined behavioral types. Finally, varying the probabilities to be very small
might make the model more applicable the real world problem of childhood vaccines.
This would require prospect theory-type probability weighing approach on the decision to
vaccinate a child. These extensions I leave for another time or another researcher.
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Appendix

(b) IC Instrument

(a) CA Instruments (baseline)

Figure 20: Chapter 3 Instruments, IC and CA treatments

(a) Symmetric Shared Lottery

(b) Asymmetric Shared Lottery

Figure 21: Chapter 4 Instruments, Shared Lotteries, Symmetric and Asymmetric
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Table 20: Summary statistics, Chapter 2 (Full Sample)
Variable
Treatment Variables
Sent
Percent returned
Payoﬀ
Decision time
Initiated at time
Text treatment (T2)
Emoji treatment (T3)
Cmc used
Cmc initiated
Subject Characteristics
Female subject
Skin tone
Dark skinned subject
Dark skinned female subject
Age
GPA
Native English speaker
Subjects that chat each day
Subjects using emoji each day
Psychometrics
Risk tolerance score
Trust score
Altruism score
Game Insights
Actions as expected
Instructions clear
Could detect partner identity
T3 Emoji Signal Variables
Received dark emoji
Received light emoji
Received male emoji
Received female emoji
Received positive emoji
Received negative emoji

Description

Mean

Std. Dev.

N

amount Mi 2 [0, 100] sent by i (“trust”)
percent of Mi returned by r (“trustworthiness”)
total payoﬀ to player
clock time of decision (0-300 seconds)
Time in seconds CMC was initiated
binary, 1=subject was in T2
binary, 1=subject was in T3
binary, 1=subject was in a dyad actually using CMC
binary, 1=the subject initiated CMC

36.68
0.9173
86.68
69.207
79
0.156
0.525
0.299
0.169

31.098
0.6713
51.920
48.621
49.49
0.893
0.500
0.458
0.375

151
137
301
301
158
301
301
301
301

binary, 1=subject reported being female
Likert, Fitzpatrick scale
binary, 1=subject reported dark skin tone
interaction term, binary, 1= dark skinned female
in years
overall grade point average
binary, 1=native English speaker
probability of text messaging any given day
probability of emoji use any given day

0.403
2.279
0.449
0.2026
20.226
3.49
0..897
0.977
0.819

0.491
0.876
0.497
0.4026
3.472
1.738
0.304
0.149
0.409

301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301
301

risk attitude index (100=“I always take a risk”)
trust attitude score (100=“people are always trustworthy”)
altruism attitude score (“100=I am or should be altruistic”)

53.742
46.06
48.366

21.062
14.50
13.742

301
301
301

degree counterpart acted as expected (100=completely)
degree to which instructions were clear (100=perfectly)
degree to which one could detect identity (100=completely)

55.701
0.981
55.701

33.379
0.247
33.379

301
301
301

binary;
binary;
binary;
binary;
binary;
binary;

0.2789
0.3607
0.1512
0.2219
0.6203
0.1836

0.383
0.4817
0.3027
0.4166
0.4868
0.3884

158
158
158
158
158
158

agents
agents
agents
agents
agents
agents

receiving
receiving
receiving
receiving
receiving
receiving

dark emoji
light emoji
male emoji
female emoji
positive emoji
negative emoji
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Table 21: Summary statistics, Chapter 2, T3 (Restricted Sample)
Variable
Investors
Responders
Amount sent
Percent returned
Payoﬀ
Cmc used
Cmc initiated
Decision time
Subject Characteristics
Female subjects
Skin tone
Dark skinned subjects
Age
GPA
Native English speakers
Subjects that chat everyday
Subjects that use emojis everyday
Subject with Apple devices
Psychometrics
Risk Tolerance score
Trust score
Altruism score
Game Insights
Counterpart actions were as expected
Instructions were clear
Degree to which partner identity could be detected
T3 Emoji Variables
Emoji used in chat
Received dark emoji
Received light emoji
Received male emoji
Received female emoji
Received positive emoji
Received negative emoji

Mean
0.506
0.494
47.138
1.053
94.656
0.937
0.5
179.065

Std. Dev.
0.502
0.502
32.795
0.74
55.208
0.244
0.502
55404.177

N
158
158
80
71
157
158
158
158

0.38
2.31
0.481
20.399
3.563
0.899
1.025
0.754
0.855

0.487
0.909
0.501
4.085
2.358
0.303
0.821
0.443
0.372

158
158
158
158
158
158
158
158
158

54.753
47.934
49.466

20.259
15.663
15.423

158
158
158

55.627
0.981
42.204

33.759
0.137
32.107

158
158
158

0.963
0.177
0.361
0.101
0.222
0.62
0.184

0.233
0.383
0.482
0.303
0.417
0.487
0.388

158
158
158
158
158
158
158

Table 22: Pearson’s r Tests, Emoji Signals Sent and Group of Sender

Female
Male
Dk. skin
Lt. skin
Female emoji
Male emoji
Dk. emoji
Lt. emoji

Female
1.00
-0.93
0.29
0.17
0.68
-0.67
0.25
0.68

Male

Dk. skin

Lt. skin

Female emoji

Male emoji

Dk. emoji

Lt. emoji

1.00
0.34
0.14
-0.53
0.44
0.61
0.42

1.00
-0.93
0.54
0.51
0.66
-0.57

1.00
0.59
0.34
-0.65
0.82

1.00
-0.49
0.35
0.26

1.00
0.15
0.19

1.00
-0.87

1.00
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Table 23: Debriefing Survey, Chapter 2
Please give thoughtful and honest responses to the items in the questionnaire.
Your answers are confidential and will not be connected with you personally.
To what extent do each of the following statements accurately describe you?
Please indicate the degree to which you personally agree or disagree
with each of the following statements by choosing from the scale below that reflects your opinion.
The sliders range from 0=strongly disagree to 100=strongly agree.
In general, I am always ready to take a risk.
I am always ready to take a risk involving confidence in strangers.
I am prepared to take risks by sacrificing to improve my future benefit, rather than immediate concerns.
If I were to participate again, I would make more money
I tell lies to protect myself.
I tell lies to protect others.
People usually tell the truth, even when they know they would be better oﬀ lying.
Most students do not cheat when taking an exam.
It’s only a rare person who would risk his own life and limb to help someone else.
If you want people to do a job right, you should explain things to them in great detail and supervise them closely.
People pretend to care more about one another than they really do.
Most people would tell a lie if they could gain by it.
The typical person is sincerely concerned about the problems of others.
Most people are honest only because they are afraid of getting caught.
If you act in good faith with people, almost all of them will reciprocate with fairness toward you.
Most people exaggerate their troubles in order to get sympathy.
Most people would stop and help a person whose car is disabled.
People are usually out for their own good.
Most people lead clean, decent lives.
What percentage of the time did your counterpart act the way you had expected them to act in the game?
The remaining questions have multiple response or open response choices.
My age is: 1=under 22, 2=22 to 30, 3=over 30
My grade point average is approximately:
I use emoticons/emoji regularly in my everyday life.
I use text chat or electronic messaging regularly in my everyday life.
English is my first/native language. 0=no 1=yes
My overall skin tone is best described as: 1=very light, 2=light, 3= brown, 4=dark
My gender is best described as: 0=male 1=female
I am an organ donor. 0=no 1=yes 2=I don’t know
I regularly give blood. 0=no 1=yes
The instructions for the session were clear. 0=no 1=yes
What type of device did you use to take part in the study? (open response)
Have you participated in this type of decision-making game before? 0=no 1=yes
What type of mobile device did you use to take part in the study (make, model)?
To what degree were you able to determine identifying characteristics of your counterpart.
For example, did you have reason to suspect your counterpart was a female, or of a particular ethnic group?
We are very interested in what you thought about the decision problem that you just completed.
In the space provided below, please tell us what kind of situation in your life this reminds you of,
or briefly explain your thought process. (open response)
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Table 24: Debriefing Survey, Chapter 3
Please give thoughtful and honest responses to the items in the questionnaire.
Your answers are confidential and will not be connected with you personally.
I understand the study’s withdraw policy. 0=no 1=yes
My gender is best described as: 0=male 1=female
My age is: 18-100 slider
How many semesters of post-high school education have you completed.
In general terms, how would you describe your political orientation? 0-100, 1= very conservative, 100=very liberal
English is my first/native language. 0=no 1=yes
How frequently (during an average day, on a scale of 0-100) do you use a mobile device to chat,
instant message, email, or post tweets?
When using digital communication, how often do you use emoji in your everyday life
(during an average day, on a scale of 0-100)?
What operating system is on your primary mobile device?
Instructions (both treatments)
You are going to be asked to classify a series of 120 pictures into one of three categories,
according to a criterion you will hear in a minute.
There will be many others completing the same task you are.
IC Treatment
We ask that you pick the most appropriate answer. While there is not a correct answer to this question,
you can earn up to 2 $5 gift cards as a bonus for choosing the answer
you think will be the most common among everyone in the study.

Table 25: Summary Statistics for Subjects, Chapter 3
Variable
Duration
Treatment
Female
Age
Semesters
Native english
Texting Exp.
Emoji Exp.
Apple device

Mean
651.804
0.505
0.512
23.304
5.061
0.916
74.752
56.434
0.804

Std. Dev. N
212.718
214
0.501
214
0.501
213
7.216
214
3.509
212
0.295
214
23.611
214
31.197
212
0.398
214

Table 26: Summary Statistics of Emoji Classifications, Chapter 3
Variable
Mean
Observations (CA treatment) 105.808
Mean (CA treatment)
2.143
Std. Dev. (CA treatment)
0.493
From male (CA treatment)
0.15
From female (CA treatment)
0.292
Observations (IC treatment)
107.5
Mean (IC treatment)
2.143
Std. Dev. (IC treatment)
0.442
From male (IC treatment)
0.167
From female (IC treatment)
0.311
110

Std. Dev.
0.436
0.452
0.098
0.359
0.456
0.58
0.449
0.113
0.374
0.465

N
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
120
119

Table 27: Summary statistics, Chapter 4
Variable
Asymmetric
Reciprocity
AxR
Draw
Shielded
Norm
Positive recip
Negative recip
Male
Age
GPA
Parent
Foreign born
NativeEng
Churchdays
Political
Income
Health
Organ donor
Blood donor
Flu shot
HPV shot
Altruism
Risk tolerance - Overall
Risk tolerance - “My health”
Risk tolerance - “Another’s health”
InsClear

Description
binary, asymmetric treatment=1
binary, reciprocity treatment=1
binary, Asymmetric x reciprocity treatment=1
binary, subject took draw=1
binary, subject shielded=1
social norm shielding, percent others
Amt. returned if shielded
Amt. returned if not shielded
binary, male=1
18-100 range
0.00-4.00 range
binary, subject is parent=1
binary, subject is foreign born
binary, subject is native English speaker
number days/week subjects make religious visits
political scale, 0(very conservative)-100(very liberal)
subject family income, $0-900k range
subject overall health, 0(poor)-100(excellent)
binary, subject is donor=1
binary, subject is donor=1
binary, subject regularly gets vax
binary, subject has had all three shots
scale 1-100(highly altruistic)
scale 1(highly risk averse)-100(risk lover)
scale 1(highly risk averse)-100(risk lover)
scale 1(highly risk averse)-100(risk lover)
binary, instructions were clear=1

111

Mean
0.235
0.26
0.25
0.769
0.231
35.238
2.776
2.352
0.432
24.192
3.095
0.177
0.083
0.927
2.67
47.046
94.06
78.502
0.578
0.502
0.429
0.716
59.063
57.338
36.57
25.135
0.949

Std. Dev.
0.425
0.439
0.434
0.422
0.422
22.184
2.214
1.812
0.496
7.164
0.569
0.382
0.276
0.26
3.507
26.302
67.418
18.463
0.495
0.501
0.496
0.451
16.255
20.208
26.587
22.888
0.22

N
412
412
412
412
412
412
206
206
412
412
406
412
411
412
409
410
402
404
412
412
410
412
412
400
351
310
412

Table 28: Instrument, Chapter 4
Instructions - All Subjects
This is a study on economic decision-making. There will a single round of play.
Your earnings depend upon the choices you and another make.
These earnings are in the form of points.
Imagine your point earnings are worth a rate of 1 point=$1 cash.
You will be given a hypothetical endowment of points, asked to make a series of choices between options.
You will then be randomly matched with another participant.
Once matched, you will be assigned one of two roles, Player 1 or Player 2, again randomly.
No one will know roles or with whom they are matched.
You will be asked about the game and yourself. Your actions and responses are anonymous.
Baseline
If you are Player 1: Your choice impacts your payoﬀ and that of your counterpart.
You each will have an endowment of 10 points, but you both will incur a loss to your endowment
with 1/5 chance from a random draw. However, you have the option to accept a lower endowment
of 6 in order to protect you both, in which case there will be no loss, and your counterpart keeps 10.
Player 2 has no actions after you make your decision.
If you are Player 2: You get an endowment of 10 points. However, you will lose your endowment
with a one in five chance from a random draw, unless Player 1 chooses to protect you both.
There will a random draw to determine whether the players will incur the loss.
After the outcomes have been determined, player earnings will be calculated as dictated by
the players’ actions, and the game will be over.
Reciprocity Treatment
If you are Player 1: Your choice impacts your payoﬀ and that of your counterpart.
You each will have an endowment of 10 points, but you both will incur a full loss to your endowment
with 1/5 chance from a random draw. However, you have the option to accept a lower endowment
of 6 in order to protect you both, in which case there will be no loss, and your counterpart keeps 10.
Your counterpart, Player 2, will have the opportunity to return any portion of their
resulting payoﬀ with you after you make your decision.
If you are Player 2: You get an endowment of 10 points. However, you will lose your endowment
with a 1/5 chance from a random draw, unless Player 1 chooses to protect you both.
You have the choice to return any amount out of your earnings to Player 1
for each of the 3 possible outcomes of the game.
There will a random draw to determine whether the players will incur the loss.
After the outcomes have been determined, player earnings will be calculated, and the game will be over.
Asymmetric Treatment
If you are Player 1: Your choice impacts your payoﬀ and that of your counterpart.
You each will have an endowment of 10 points, but you will incur partial loss to your endowment
with 1/5 chance from a random draw. However, your counterpart, Player 2 will lose everything.
You as the first player have the option to accept a lower endowment of 6 in order to protect you both,
in which case there will be no loss, and your counterpart keeps 10.
Player 2 has no actions and is passive after you make your decision.
If you are Player 2: You have no actions. You get an endowment of 10 points.
However, you will lose your endowment with a 1/5 chance from a random draw,
unless Player 1 chooses to protect you both. Your counterpart will keep a fraction of their earnings.
There will then a random draw to determine whether the players will incur the loss.
After the outcomes have been determined, player earnings will be calculated, and the game will be over.
Reciprocity x Asymmetric Treatment
If you are Player 1: Your choice impacts your payoﬀ and that of your counterpart.
You each will have an endowment of 10 points, but you will incur a partial loss to your endowment
with 1/5 chance from a random draw. Your counterpart will lose everything.
However, you have the option to accept a lower endowment of 6 in order to protect you both,
in which case there will be no loss, and your counterpart keeps 10. Your counterpart will
have to opportunity to share any amount from their resulting payoﬀs with you after you make your decision.
If you are Player 2: You get an endowment of 10 points. However, you will lose your endowment
with a 1/5 chance from a random draw, unless Player 1 chooses to protect you both
by accepting a lower payoﬀ and declining the draw. Player 1 would only lose a fraction of their endowment
with a 1/5 chance. Once Player 1 has decided whether to take the draw or not,
you as Player 2 may choose to send your counterpart any amount of your resulting payoﬀ.
You have the choice to return any amount out of your earnings to Player 1
for each of the 3 possible outcomes of the game.
There will a random draw to determine whether the players will incur the loss.
After the outcomes have been determined, player earnings will be calculated, and the game will be over.
All subjects
Imagine you are Player 1. Look at the payoﬀs below, and make a decision: 1=shield 0=take draw
Of the people in this study overall, what percentage was do you think took the draw? 0-100 slider
We would now like to ask you some questions about yourself.
Proceed to the next section. Please answer honestly, thoughtfully, and completely.
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Table 29: Debriefing Survey, Chapter 4
Please give thoughtful and honest responses to the items in the questionnaire.
Your answers are confidential and will not be connected with you personally.
My age is: 18-100 slider
My gender is best described as: 0=male 1=female
My marital status is: 1=single 2=married 3=divorced 4=separated 5=other
Do you have children? 0=no 1=yes
My college grade point average (GPA) is approximately:
English is my first/native language. 0=no 1=yes
Were you born in the United States? 0=no 1=yes
How many days out of an average month would you say you attend church or religious/spiritual gatherings? 0-31 slider
In general terms, how would you describe your political orientation? 0-100, 1= very conservative, 100=very liberal
What is your family household?s yearly income (estimated)? $0-900,000 slider
Please rate each of the following statements as best describes what is true for you.
Indicate on a scale of 0-100, 0=strongly disagree to 100=strongly agree.
Altruism Measures
In general, how would you classify your overall health? 0-100 slider, 0=terrible, 100=excellent
I am a registered organ donor. 0=no 1=yes 2=I don’t know
I regularly give blood. 0=no 1=yes
Do you regularly receive an annual flu shot? 0=no 1=yes
Have you received all three booster shots for the HPV vaccine? 0=no 1=yes
I give food or money to someone I perceive as homeless.
I perform unpaid volunteer work that benefits people I do not know.
I volunteer time caring for, children, elderly individuals, or someone with a severe disability.
I lend non-trivial amounts of money to people.
I tell lies to protect myself.
I tell lies to protect others.
I often have caring or concerned feelings for people less fortunate than I am.
When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel protective of them.
Other people’s misfortunes disturb me a great deal.
People should be willing to help others who are less fortunate than others
Personally assisting people in trouble is very important to me.
It’s only a rare person who would risk his own life and limb to help someone else.
The typical person is sincerely concerned about the problems of others.
Most people would stop and help a person whose car is disabled.
Risk Measures
What percentage of outcomes in our lives do we have control of?
I strictly follow my physician’s advice or prescribed treatments.
I engage in what are generally considered safe sexual practices.
In general, I am always ready to take a risk.
I am always ready to take a risk involving confidence in strangers.
I am prepared to take risks by sacrificing to improve my future benefit, rather than immediate concerns.
I am prepared to take risks when driving a car.
I am prepared to take risks regarding my health.
I am prepared to take risks regarding a friend or family member’s health.
I am prepared to take risks regarding a stranger’s health.
The remaining questions have multiple response or open response choices.
The instructions for the session were clear. 0=no 1=yes
Imagine there will one draw out of as bag. There are 5 orange balls and 1 blue cube.
What statement best describes drawing the blue cube?
1=Drawing the blue cube is certain compared to drawing an orange ball,
2= Drawing the blue cube is impossible,
3=Drawing the blue cube is likely compared to drawing an orange ball.,
4=Drawing the blue cube is unlikely compared to drawing an orange ball,
5=Drawing the blue cube is equally as likely as drawing an orange ball.
Imagine there are 4 poker chips in a bag, three white and one red. A chip is drawn randomly out of the bag, only once.
With what probability will the red one will be drawn from the bag?
Imagine you have an asset that pays $100 with .25 probability, and pays $0 with .75 probability.
What is the expected value of the payoﬀ you would receive?
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